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VOL. SSIII. 1sn. No. CII. 
L 
LECTURE. 
Friday, hIay 2, 1879. 
LIELITEXIST-GESEEAL Sir DAXIEL LY SORS, K.C.B., Qnartermastci.- 
Gencral, in  the Chair. 
THE IIILITARY ASPECT OF CAXADA. 
Licntcnant-Colonel T. B. STRASOE, R.A., Dominion Inspector of 
Artillery. 
8‘ TIIEEE is nothing likc leather ” was tho adrice of tho tnnncr to his 
beleaguered compatriots ; there is nothing likc paper, in 2°F form except 
dolfar bills, would appear to be the opinion of the people of Canada, 
judging by their representatives. The Parliamentary Votc for military 
purposcs has heen stadily diminishing for some Fears past, while the 
military literaturc has been as steadily increasing from responsible as 
well as irresponsihlc SOUPCCS. Tlic defcncc of Canada, bas been amply 
rcntilated and the best possible n6-ricc given, from the date of the first 
3filitia Bill, originated by the gallant Officer non- in the chair, thc 
csccllencc of which was proved bj- the defcat of the Government sup- 
porting it, while its principal proyisions wcre adopted by tlicir suc- 
cessors. Sir TV. Jer-cois and Colonel Flatchcr also planned n completc 
sjstem of dcfcncc. 
To General Sir Patrick NncIlongnl, xlicn Adjutfint-General of 
Xilitia, is mainly due tIic localization of militia in military districts, 
as i t  still erists in Canada. Tkc Gnnncry Scliools were formed under 
Colonel R. Ross when Adjutant-General of Nilitin, while the 3IilitarF 
College under Licutcnant-Coloncl Hcwitt, R.E., has been developed 
during thc command of Lieutcnant-General Sir Selby Smjth, whoso 
annual rcports. have becn most. complclc and detailed, and replctc 
with excellent, suggcstions, while the prcsent Adjutant-General, Colonel 
Powell, R Canadinn Officer of long cxpcrience, is familiar with all practi- 
cal dctails of the depnrtmcnt. What nced theu that I should add to 
the paper bulwarks of Canada, to which I rcgret to s a ~  I hwe  already 
contributed n i th  bnt littIe result ? I do so only by request, for tho 
information of tho members of this 1nstitut.ion. The subject divides 
itself into five heads :- 
VOL. LSIIC. 3 D  
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73s TI= NILITART ASPECT OF GXXADA. 
1st. Strategic Geography of Canada. 
2nd. IIilitia, Actirc and Rcscrrc. 
3rd. Permanently Embodicd Nilitia and Educational Establish- 
4th. Armamcnt and Supply. 
5th. Canadian Contingent for Imperial Scrvicc and Xilitary Coloni- 
mcnts, i.c., Schools of Gunnery and Royal Military Collcgc. 
zation. 
Part I.-~TRATEGIC GEO RAPITT. 
Bcforo deciding on what arc thc strategic points of most importnncc, 
and tho measurcs that should be adopted for dcfencc, it is necessary 
to considar what aggrcssiw operations an cncmy would probably undcr- 
take, and the natural base and lines of liis opcrations, as wclI as our 
own facilities for conccntration. I ha-ic not tnkcn notc of thc mildcr- 
ness bctmccn Lnkc Supcrio~ and tho Pacific ; as it can scarcely bc said 
to contain a military objcctive, an army could not exist i n  it, and in 
any casc KO could not defend it, unless thc Cauadian Pacific RailKay 
is constrnctcd. Prom thc North Polc mc need fcar no aggrcssion, 
our brnvo Canadians would find only allies in tlic rcsistlcss cohorts 
of Field-Xarshal Frost as t h y  smccp :icross tho dcsolato plains 
to meet tho southern invader; unfortunately our flanks arc not so 
secure, resting on Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, for though Britan- 
nia may bc said in music-hall parlanco to rulc tho T F ~ C S ,  m e  cannot 
cntircly imaginc oursclvcs to liavo a monopoly of thc watcr-ways of thc 
irorld. Captain Colomb, R.X.A., in tlic ablc papers hc bas from timc to 
time read in this Institution, has only too clcarly promd to US that  tho 
p o k e  of the ocean, as carried out by tho swarms of cruizcrs in.thc 
days of Nelson, or by tlic swift rrooden steamers of a later date (which 
requiro numcrous and sccnrc coaling stations, more especially if  coal 
armour is mcticablc), must be considcrcd from a very diffcrcnt point 
floating castles of iron, the a\-ailablc number of which for Pacific or  
transatlantic serrico might bc counted on tho fingcrs of onc hand. 
Pac$c SeaZlonril. 
TVc must thcrcforo considcr tlio high seas as n basc of operations 
common t o  oursclres and our possiblc enemies, rvlio harc morcovcr a 
sccandary bnsc on tho continent, which TTC roughly call British North 
Amcrirn, i.c., Alaska, tlic slicc with which thc one Englc accommo- 
dated thc otlicr, pcrhaps Kith the prospect of a fnturc carcasc in that 
local it^. Our inadcquatcly protcctcd coaling Etation at Vancouwr is 
much ncxrcr sucli secondcq bascs, on the Pacific shorc of Asiatic 
Russia, as wcll as thc harbours of Oregon and California, to say 
nothing of othcrs along thc 600 or 700 milcs of coast mhcrc wc haw 
no foothold, that could bc utilized by n soi-disad neutral Power, when 
certain complications havc necessitatcd thc conccntiation of our fleet 
in castcrn n ther  than Testern watcrs. 
During D discussion in  this theatrc, I was asked whethcr it was the 
duty of fhc Canadian or Impcrinl Gowrnment to defend Vnncouvci~’~ 
Island and British Columbia, my answer on this point is not of any 
practical raluc. I canonly tclI you what both Governmcnts haw done 
of vicm TT E en the British Flcct consists of our somcwhnt cumbrously 
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TIIE JIJLITART ASPECT OF CXSADA. 730 
to-xanls it, and remind you that until the Canadian Pacific Railroad is 
built, t11c Canadian Gorcrnmcnt mould hare to send from its Storc 
Department a t  Ottawa or Nontrcal round by Capo Horn cvery muskct, 
ocery pound of powder, and every uniform button requircd in  British 
Columbia. I fail to sco tho advantagc of tho boastcd bolt of territory 
that circles the g10bo if tho clectric current of Imperial powcr which 
i s  absolutely necessary for Imperial defcnco cannot freely pcrmeato 
throng11 it. Tho completion of tho Canadian Pacific railroad is not 
mcrc?y a vital ncccssity to  tho integrity of tlic Dominion, but of tho 
Empire. It is as much an Imperial as a ColoniaI question. I ts  com- 
plctron would bc tho rcalization of the dreams of Clu+.tophcr Colum- 
bus, of Vasco di Gama, and the numerous hardy mariners who havo 
tried to force thcirrray to tho east by frozen north or south, or sultry 
tropic csplorntion. Tho shortest routo from 'Ircland to Japan by a 
thousand milcs n-ould bo' tho great circlc of tho globe dong \&ich 
thc Canadian Pacific runs. By it n-ill rcturn tho costly silks and teas 
of China, the products of tho Spico Islands, of Australia and India, 
the cotton of Fccjec, as mll as thc grain of thc great valley of thc 
Saskatchoxan. Without it Canada is a ciil-tle-sac. Tho struggling 
nationality resembles n young giant, w~oosc careless parents allomcd 
onc nostril to bo stnffcd up by the loss of the unfrozen seaports of tlio 
Stntc of Xaine, and now, aftcr gi-cing up Oregon and tho San Juan 
p.assagc, that other Canadian nostril, TC arc threatened wit11 thc seces- 
sion of British Columbia, which can ncithcr bc defended or traded 
with. Tradc is thc life-blood of Anglo-Saxon communities, and rail- 
roads tho arteries. Kcvcr ha-i-ing had tho good fortunc of being pcr- 
miftcd to visit tho country, QS fell to tlie lot of my assistant 
inspector, I haw carefully read tho exploration reports, and I 
do not bclicro in insurmountable en,+ccring difficulties. Tho rail- 
road mill Sct follow thc Indian trail through tho Teto Jauno pass, 
which is only4,OOO feet, half thchcight of tho lowest pass on tho United 
Statcs linc. Salmon make their way up to tho head-water of tho 
Frazcr riwr ; 12 feet is the limit of a salmon leap. Thc trail of tho 
Indian, tho run of water systems, is tho natural line of railroads. 
Tlircp out of four of our explorations haw been a t h m r t  threc ranges 
of monntains. The folIoming extract from tho Nilitis Report, p!gc 506, 
will show tlic action taken by General Selhy SmFth, irhich IS, I am 
informed, to bc supplemented by thc further Rcport of an Engineer 
Officer from England, and n Royal Artillery OEccr from Canada :- 
Extract of Report 011 tho Site, Co~istructio~~, a i d  Arnlanzeiit of the Coast 
I3afferie8, erecfed for thc D$32ce of the ITarhozirs of victorin and 
iTsqiiimaZt, T'awotiser LZaiid, British Coluinbia-thring fhc wo)ttAs 4 
Aim, July, a i d  August, 1878, by Lieziteiiaizt-Coloind D. T. h u i i z ,  
Captaiit Royal Artillery, a d  6upeefor of Artillery. 
Tho follon-ing extract from the gcnel-a1 instructions reccired by mo 
on tho day of my dcparture from Kingston, 13th ?day, 1878, affords 
sufficient infoimation as to the general naturc of the work proposed 
to bo undertaken, together with the limitations imposed as to itz 
C S t C l l t ,  viz. :- 
3 ~ 2  
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740 SIILTTART ASPECT OF CANADA. 
(6 The Dominion Government have given orders for the erection of 
'4 a battery on BlcAulafs Point, Victoria, Ynncouver Island, for tile 
LC protection of the entrance to Victoria and Esquimalt harbonrs 
4'  respectively. 
z c  He1. Xajesty's Gorernment has scnt orders to supply sue{ guns 
6' as max be requircd from the dockyard reserres at Esquimalt. 
I enclose a, plnn prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Blair, R.A. Yon 
'6 will obserm he proposes a small battery on Victoria Point, and 
'6 another on Fisgaid Island for the better security of both harbonn, 
' L  in addition to that now proposed on 'hfeAulny's Point. 
(( The latter is considercd of the chief importance, the other two 
L L  only subsidiary. 
"It is presumed the Royal Nand authoritics will take steps to 
" arm Fisgard Island. 
L L  Yon Kill use your discretion as to whether IIcAulay's Point alone 
L C  or in conjunction with Victoria Point should bc armed. 
(( In this you mill be guided b-~- regard to economy combined with 
" efficiencj-, and the means of manning two batteries. 
' I  A volunteer battery of artillerj-men has b p n  ordered to be mised 
(( and equipped at Victoria. You mill satisfy yourself that means arc 
'' a t  hand for instructing the Officers and men and rendering them 
' L  efficient, and sou will assist in doing so if nccessarj-. 
(Signed) .( E. SELBY SJIPTH, 
(' Liezcfeizaizt-G'enel.aZ. 
(( Choice of Sites for Batteries. 
'C Ha-&g placed mrself in communication with Captain F. Robin- 
(' son, Her lIajestfa ship ( Opal,' tlie then ,Senior Karal Officer on 
'( the Station, I made with him and Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton a 
' 6  careful examination of thc coast, with a riew to determine npon the 
best sites for defensive works. 
(' In this importnut duty I was nf'terrwrds assisted by D Board of 
(( Officers, detailed for this duty br Rear-Admiral clc Horsey, Con- 
'( mander-in-Chief on tlie Pacific, and composed of Captain Bedford, 
" Her BIajestfs ship ' Shab,' Captain Burrowes, R.N.A., and Gun- 
'' nery Lieutenant Lindsaj-, Her Mnjestfs ship ' Shah.' 
"It may be sufficient here .to state tliat the plans proposcd by 
" Lieutenant-Colonel Blair XCIO not found to be practicable, and it was 
found necessary, in order to defend with the fire of a t  least one p n  
'' all the approaclics to  both harbours, to place ten pieces of ordnance 
'( in position a t  the sites undermentioncd, and arranged as f o l l o ~ s  :- 
( I  Finlayson Point, 2 64-prs. 
'( Victoria 2 GLprs. 
L L  Brothers Island 1 8-in.9 ,, ,, 
and 2 64-prs. ,, 
R.1I.L. 
'6 B I ~ A U I ~ ~ ' ~  ,': 3 7-in. G& ton :: 
The best means for the defence and development of British 
Columbia, our coal depbts, and the terminus of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway would I beliere be military colonization of the old Roman or 
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THE JIILITART ASPECT OF CAXADA. 74 1 
modern Austrian type, which I hope to discuss more fully at the end 
of this paper. 
Let us nom consider our left flank. 
Aflan tic Seaboard. 
The second common basc of operations against Canada would be 
tl1c Atlantic seaboard. It is needless to specify the numerous locali- 
ties round which the struggle of old wars have surged, of Iyhich time 
docs not alter the stmtegiq conditions. Along that indented coast 
(which would still serve ourselves or our neighbours, mhichever had 
tbe strongestband uppermost to begin with), vessels like the “Cimbria ” 
could still be fitted out as priratccrs against our commercc and thc 
unprotected fishing towns of tho E’om Scotian, New B r u n s ~ e k ,  
Princc Edward Island, and Newfoundland coasts. After reading 
Mr. Brassey’s figures, which tcll US that Eerrfoundland alonc in 18Fd 
had 10,000 men engaged i n  thc seal fishery, while the value of the fish 
esported from that island alone amounted to 1,340,0001., onc feels 
texnptcd to say if t h y  suffer, tlic verdict will bc, “serve them right.” 
But me cannot alloiv such verdicts to go forth to tho world, if there is 
anF real Imperialism left among US. It is to l o  hoped tho hitherto 
obdurate islanders, thau whom MY. Brassoy sajs thcrc are no subjects 
of tho Crown morc loyal or devoted, will round off our transatlantio 
Dominion by joining it. 
Fortunatcly at  Halifas wc hare retained some of the d t h m  TnfiOllCS 
repin et ycpdoriciit. Wc need not tliercforc discuss the defence of this 
fortress and harbour, which, homercr valuablc in other senses, can in 
no sense be considered a safe basc for operating in the inland defeneo 
o€ Canada, for the Treaty of 1843, which h d e d  over the State of 
Naine, sends a mcdge of territory up to within a fern miles of tlic 
intercolonial nilroad, which a handful of troopers could a t  any moment 
rcnder unsorviceable in a night, thus cutting off retreat to Halifax or 
succour from thencc to the upper provinces. It is true that detach- 
ments were sent from Halifax during the Trent difficulty; but the 
United States werc a t  that timc disunited States. There arc, un- 
fortunately, other undefended points on tho intercolonial railroad 
where the destruction of D bridge by the boat’s crew of B privateer 
would stop communication for some timc. Thcre formerly existed R 
Grand Trunk Railway brigade, and if rcsuscitated (in the Inter- 
colonial) it would be an cBeient means of transporting guns in ex- 
tcmporised railway batteries along the coast, fortifying stations, &c. 
Unfortunately railway eiiydoyis ham shown themselves sometimes too 
ready to join the disturbers of the prosperity of nations. At man? 
points along the coast arc small companies Of men, morc or less trained 
as garrison artillery, but without cfficieni; guns or earth-work covei*. 
Thc blue crosses on the map shorn tho localities Tvherc there arc such 
garrison batterics, open crosses, field batteries. Among other impor- 
tant places, the coal mines of Pictou h a w  been included in this partid 
clefcncc, which it is hoped may grow into somothing tsngible in timc. 
Under this head the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Sir Selby 
Smyth, rem a1 *k s:- 
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743 TIIE JIILITART ASPECT OF CANADA. 
S L  w i t h  regard to tho dcfcnces of thc Atlantic coast, it was rccom. 
I' mcndcd that on Partridge Island, in thc Bay of St. John, N.B., a 
"battery should bc nrmcd with four ?-inch 7-ton rifled guns, and 
three 64-pounder wrought-iron gum j &gro Point, with two ?-ton 
and t h e e  G$-pouudci*s ; Sydney, Capo Breton, two batteries in suc- 
c' cession and in support of cach othcr, on Chapel nnd Nines Points, 
"each to h a ~ o  two '/-ton and t x o  G4-po~ndcr rifled guns; and on 
"Edward Point, tiro ?-ton and two G4.pounders; Prince Edward 
 island, two 7-ton and two G4-pounder rifled guns on Battery Point; 
t c  Pictou, N.S., tlircc ?'-ton and thrcc 6&pnundcrs on Xoodic Point. 
4' The total cost of thcse armaments, TFith 100 rounds of ammunition 
(' pcr gun, xas csthatcd at about 50,OOOZ. sterling, subject to certain 
6' deductions, according to thc defences which might bc adoptcd for 
'' Charlottetown and Sydney." 
Thc strategic points on thc railway system and on our Atlantic 
seaboard may be said to bc :- 
St. Andrew's at the mouth of thc Jnnics, our boundary r h i ;  
St. John, N.B., and Frcdcricton, Halifax, Sydncy, Pictou, Charlottc 
Town, Princc Ed\mrd Island, Xoncton, Chatham, and Dalhousic. 
Qucbcc, thc most important of all, the ptcway of tlic St. Lawrence. 
Qzccbcc. 
Thc strategic valuc of Qucbcc can scnrccly Bc csaggcratcd ; its fall 
lost a continent to Fnncc, its successful dcicnec by ourselves in 1775 
was pregnant with far mightier results to the world a t  largo than 11-c 
tronblc oursclrcs to think of in these dzys when a sensational xien's- 
p a p  article diverts tho who10 thought of tlic nation for tlic usual ten 
days, to bc succecdcd by another, and yct another erotchct, to tho  
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THE 3IILITARY ASPEOT OF C-LYAD-1. i 4 3  
q-qmrent exclusion o f  the long pondered lines of policy on which 
Empires are built, and from the neglect of lrhich, they crumble to 
decay; but tlicrc arc points of vital intcrest d & I i  cannot bc discussed 
by D military lecturer in  an Institution like this. Sulfcc to  say, tho 
fall of Quebec would loso US tho key of the gate of Canada, nnd close 
tho only door by which British succour could come to it, or n 
fleet of gunboats enter its inland mters.  I n  any case, unpleasant ns 
the truth ma>- appcar, Quebec remains tho only onc possible strong- 
llold upon which our militia, if rolled up by an ore1*~r~vhclming forcc 
from thc west, could retreat and wait for that help IThich never 
W-ouId be denied from tho old country. NcanwhiIc, n besieger must 
be kcpt at  arm’s length, which can onlx be done by supcrior artillery 
so disposed as to rotain its pomcr against attack, if not indefinitely, 
nntil such timo as rclief is a t  hand. 
Inland continental fortresses differ materially from tllc maritinc 
strongholds of Great Britain. I can reen11 no instance in our history, 
sinco the loss of Calnis nnd Fort lhhon,l  where the old flag has 
lowered at  the bidrliug of a bcsiegcr for want of succour from tho sea, 
ourgreat base of operations. Xspcciallydocs it hold good in tho 
case of a maritimo fortrcss sncl  as Qucl~cc, where “ FicldJIarshal 
‘‘ Frost ” prcrents the possibility of a Iocger iuvcstmcnt than five 
summer months; and cvcn i n  summer the mighty s ~ ~ p  of the 
St. Lmircncc  odd render complctc inrcstmcnt almost an impossi- 
bility to thc inwdcr, &o could not transport rery lien\-y guns and 
their cnormous rcight of ammunition for a long distanco .over 
difficult country, with few and bad roads, impassable in tho spring 
and autumn? 
The defender, holding the river within the circle of forts, could 
throw his ~ l i o l e  force on a section of thc enemy divided L-J- tlic St. 
Lm-rencc and separated by it from their base of operation and lino of 
retreat. Tlic c o q l e t c  railmay s-ptcrns at the commmd of Prussin did 
not enable licr to bring licavicrguns than GO-pounders in hcr siege train. 
Thcrc are certain physical data which do not alter, viz., the strength 
of men and Iiorscs, the badncss of country roads. Railroads, from 
the numerous other calls upon them in war, hare bccn found incapable 
of transporting rery hcnvF artillery. I t  is liardly to be supposed 
that tho mistress of the scas and her eldest danghter, Cannda, mliosc 
1 Xor do I know of any fortrcss but Quebec from bcforc nhosc walls an English 
flcct llas rccoilcd sitliout sueccss, tliough not nitliout honour, according to tho 
tiwlitiond tcstimony of tho gallant l?rcnch Canadian, who brought to sIioro tho 
taticrcd Bag of Admiral Phipps, d w n  asked if it was not k c a q j  hc rcplicd, ‘‘ 016, 
“ e m i t  CaJlIaPadC, toits ores raisoe ; c’est rko~ge’de gloire.” A h ,  tho rcsponscof tlic 
stern old Do Proiitenac ~ I i c n  summoncd to surrcudcr, ‘‘I mll  gire 1011 my a w m r  
“ from thc iiiouth of niy guns,” i ~ o u l d  bc scarccly possible from thc autiquatcd arma- 
mcnt of That, nns thc Gibraltar of dmcrica. 
* 18% nns thc ceiitcuary of tlic nintcr cipcdition of Gcncralj BContgonicv and 
Aruold agiuat Qiicbcc ; tho lattcr n-itli incrdiblc hard3hips came tllrougll t t c  Statc 
of Nnine, autl,ou the dmtli of lris colleague, withdrcw tlic shnttcred rcmuants of their 
forcc. Tkc DCW dctnclied forts at. Lcrk conipletcly command thc intcrscction of 
roa& and rdxrajs east, i cs t ,  niid aouth, a3 wcll as the rallcy of thc ChnudiLlrc and 
Kcuncbec road, b r  nhich Arnold marckcd, and they occupy tkc ground from which 
Wolfc ehcllcd th; t o m .  
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744 TIIE JIILITARP ASPECT OF CL%XADA 
commercial navy alrcady ranks third among the commercial navies 
of the Todd, would permit the siegc train destined for the attack 
on Quebec to bc conreyed by sen. 
Quebec might easily bc superior to that brought against it even by 
hostilc ironclads, whose unarmourcd dccks would bc exposed to tho 
citadel fire, which, with the addition of a few torpedoes at the Trarerse, 
would secure thc St. Lawrence, if tliosc upon whom the responsibility 
devolves considered the subject of sufficient importance to n-arrant 
comparatively trifling espenditure, and to prevent, while there is yet 
time, thc erection of buildings which would close the most important 
lines of fire. 
Frontier. 
Having considcrcd thc stratcgic conditions with rcferciicc to the 
Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, it rcmnins to consider those of tlic 
south mith reference to tho natural bascs and lines of an enemy's 
operations and the objectiw hc would sclcct for attack. In doing so 
thc question is treated mcrely in a military and, it is hoped, philo- 
sophic spirit, such as cannot givc offence to  our kinsmcn of thc great 
Anglo-Saxon Republic, with whom tlic most friendly rclations exist, 
but they ham not alv;ays been ablc to restrain thc lamlcss bands of 
Fenians and their sympathizers who ha-ie from time to time raided 
ncruss our frontier; besides, time may change their motto to "Ex E C ~ O  
" p lures." 
Tho frontier of tho Province of Quebcc is contiguous to thc territory 
of the United States for n distance of about 450 miles, that is to say, 
167 miles of imnginary boundary along the 45t,h parallel of latitude 
southward of Xontreal and Qiicbcc, running from St. Regis, on tho 
castcrn cnd of Lake St. Francis (an expansion of the St. Lnwrcncc), 
to the Connecticut river, i n  thc township of Hcrcford, abutting on 
the State of New Hampshire. Tlicnce in an irregular line tlic boundary 
of tho Statc of Maine follows the high ground which forms the miter- 
shed between the Kcnnebcc rivcr, in the Unitcd States, and tho 
Chaudibre, a tributary of the St. Lawrence, running north-cast in 
accordance with thc disastrous arbitration of the Ashburton Treaty of 
1842, which brings the territory of the State of JIaine to within 2.5 
miles of tho St. Lnwrcuce, oppositc Rivi8rc-du-Loup. Unfortunatcly 
at this point, as before stated, the Intcrcolonial Railn-ay is close to 
tho frontier, which from this point runs south-cast until it mects 
Dominion territory in Kew Brunswicli. The disadvautagc of hadng 
a wcdgc of foreign territory thrwt  into our own is not altogether SO 
great as might a t  first sight bc anticipatcd, the character of the 
country being for tho most part rugged, corercd with forest, and 
thinly populated; thcre are no natural commercial lincs, nor nny 
railroads running through it to the north, thc watershed north of tho 
St. John's rircr being close to the St. Lnwrencc prevcnts tho forma- 
tion of any long or nnvigablo tributaries to the St. Lnn-rcnce; thcro 
is, therefore, no natural cliannel for intcrcommnnic a t' ion or commcrcc 
from thc northern an& of thc Statc of JInine into Canada. As mili- 
tary lines of operation qlwnjs follow natural clianncls, no inrasion of 
The armament, thercfore, 
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T I E  JIILITAItP ASPECT OF CXY-LD-L 745 
Canada bas ever been attempted from this point, the nearest to it 
being that of General Arnold, of the United States, iu 1775, and he 
follo\vxl tlie line of the Kennebec and ChaudiBrc rivers. On the 
other hand, in case of offensive operations from Canada, in the direc- 
tion of the Penobscot ~a l l cy ,  or to seize the triple railroad terminus 
of Woodstock, Richmond, and LlouIton, leading to St. John, N.B., 
our rc-entering frontier mould form an advantageous haso of opera- 
tions, backed by Quebec and the St. Lawrence and the 'Intercolonial 
Railvay. Though tho long line of frontier (4,000 miles from ocean 
to ocean) is apparently attackable at all points, tlie defence of tho 
country, even with its much smaller population than that of tho con- 
tiguous States, would, with proper forethought and organization, be 
by no means so difficult nor impossible a hsk as some would have us 
to supposo. 
Although, offing to the length and character of frontier, it is quite 
impossible and not desirable to protect it throughout its whole length, 
an enemy must capture and establish liirnsclf in some r i ta l  points 
before he could obtain any dccidcd military advantage. There aro 
only a few such points. If t h y  mcre put into and maiirtaiiied in IL 
proper state of defence, with a small body of regular troops as tho 
nucleus of a garrison to bo furnished by the local militia, such posi- 
tions could be held during the fire months, in which alone it is pos- 
sible €or an enemy to  carry on opcrntions on the large scale necessary 
to capture them. 
Canada is IL long strip of communications, its main artery, the St. 
Lawrenee, being the fosse of a mtnral  fortress, open during tho 
snmmer season (winter operations m y  be dccmed impracticable in 
this climate)' to the gunboats of Great Britain, and to them alone, as 
long as tho fortrcss of Quebec is kept in a defensive condition. In 
conscqucnce of tlie character of tho original seignorial settlement of 
the Province of Qncbec, them arc numerous. lines of roads running 
parallel to the St. Lawrence, forming the front and rear of the cou- 
cessions or seignorid grants of land. 
The Grnnd Trunk Bai lmy and others on tho south shore are now 
supplemented by railways on the north shore of the St. Lawrence and 
the Lakes, v i th  their usual tclcgraphic lines, the whole forming a series 
of communications vhich have alwvqs enabled Canadian troops to act 
upon >That arc practically interior lines, and so concentrate readily 
upon important strategic points, aswas prored in the lato Fenian 
raids. 
Both Great Britain 
and the United States arc forbidden by treaty to build gunboats on 
the Lakes, but gunboats can and havc with the first noto of m r  
passed up the St. Lawrence through the Lachinc Canal' and on to 
the Lakes. The Bcauharnois Canal on tho south shore would pro- 
' Though thc old Frcnch Canadian voyapur sokdicrs and Indians often mado, 
during tinter, inroads iiito Eng1kh co~onics, yct the coridition~ attending these 
sdf-reliant cxpeditiom of a fen hardy mcn hiddcn bg denso forests till thcy burst 
upon somc defenceless post, arc entirclj unliko thc conditions of modern warfare. 
, 
Successful initiative in war counts for much. 
Xom bcing still further enlarged. 
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74G TIE XILITART ASPECT OF OXiAD-1. 
bably bc rcndcrcd nsclcss a t  thc commenccmcnt of hostilities by tho 
United Statcs ; but tho neccssitics of commcrcc, which arc Tyiih 
stronger than any conddcration of Imperial defence, point to thc proha- 
b1c cnlargcment of the old canal on the north shorc of the Cedar rapih 
to Cotcan landing. Thcro is moreover tlic second and protected inland 
navigation route by the x-otcrs of the Ottawa to tllc capital, thence b;F 
tho Ridcau Canal t o  Lakc Ontario and Kingston, which is thc otlicr 
gat0 opening to us tIic initintivc npinst  thc conipnrativcly dcfenccless 
emporiums of commcrcc on Lakc Ontario ; wliilc tlic TVclland and other 
canals lend to the niorc western waters. A counter-initiative from 
thc Atlantic seaboard by tlic Eric Canal xi-ould no doubt bc attcmptcd. 
Tho Ohio Canal and rimr dsbouching at  Clcvelnnd is too long n lino 
of counter-current navigation from which to start initiative gunboat 
attack. 
Colonel Flctclicr in his paper nndcr this 11eacI remarks: " Tllc 
'' grcat trading cit-y of Chicago affords means to tho United States, 
" conmanding as they do thc outlet from Lnkc Xichigon, rapidly to 
" cstcmporisc at thc commenccment of hostilities, out of thcir flect of 
" merclmntmcn and steamers, vcsscls of war, sufficient. to command 
" Lakc Huron, and probably to forcc an cntrj- into Lakc Eric, \\-hero 
" thcy would bc mct by vessels from Buffalo and other largo ports. 
" Thus Ontario would be tlireatencd on its nortlicrn, ri-cstcrn, and 
'( sonth-western frontier, and would in great mcasurc dcpcnd for its 
'( defunce on D land force, but this land force would run D risk of 
" being isolated and cut off, unless its lcft flank were protcctcd, and 
" communication m&taincd with thc Province of Quebec, and through 
" that pro-iiinco with thc sca. Tlicrcfore, coiife pi coute, tho corn- 
" mand of Lake Ontario must bc secured and maintnincd. Hero 
" Canada is at an advantngc, the bcst harbours being situatcd on her 
(' shores, and tho greatcr number of tho steamers trading on the Iakc 
'' Icing held or manned b-y Canadians. These harbours, such as 
( 6  Coburg, Port Hopc, Toronto, Hamilton, Ningam, and TVcllmd Canal, 
" would rcquirc thc protcction cithcr of pcrrnancnt or cstcmporiscd 
IC fortifications." 
K;~2~sfolz. 
?Lingston should bc rcndercd 'as sceurc as passiblc from capturc, 
and contain D strong garrison cnpnblc of protccting thc month of tho 
Ridcan Canal and supporting detachments guarding tlic Grand Trunk 
Railway at Brockvillc a i d  Prcscott to Jlontrcal, thus protecting 
Ottama, tho capital, and the communications to thc east. 
It is to bc hopcd that we shall on tlic Lakes also so far fakc tho 
initiativc recommended by JIr. Brasscy, KP., by cncoumging a 
\-oluntecr nawl  rescrvo on Lakc Ontario. The common trading 
stcamcrs and FCSSC~S, i f  armed with an ordinarr rificd field gun, would 
require no extm strcngthening, and from the poivcr and raugc of such 
guns, mould be D powcrful means of rctaining command of this lnkc, 
as mcIl as of. the watcr communications betwxn Kingston and Mon- 
treal, ancl tho cnnals'which avoid the se-icral rapids of tho St. 'Lam- 
rcnce and thc Rideau Canal. Troops would bc conccntratcd at tho 
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THE JIILITART ASPECT O F  GASAD-1. 747 
junctions of railroads and communications from thc west, such as 
Samia, Stratford, London, Guelph. 
An attack from the west, howcvcr, though it might bo n good 
political mom,, would bc bad military strategy, as tcnding only to  roll 
up tho dcfcncc along the lincs of communication to1rards thc point of 
support and base of supply, instcad of cutting it in two by an attack 
on tho centre. 
Ait BIZCMJ~S Central Dase-L=ines of Opcrntio,t nltd Objectice. 
Tho cncmy’s principal basc of operations would probably bc a t  
Albany, tho ccntivl point from which natural lincs of opcration lead 
dircct to Montrcal, northatst  to Qucbcc, and n-cstcrly to Miagam or 
Sackcts hgrbour, if Kingston mero D sccondnry objective. 
Albany is moreorer an arsenal to which them is acccss by river, 
road, and railmy f?om all quartcrs, including tho Pcnnsylrania cod and 
iron couutry. 
Springfield, n small-arm factory, and Tros, also a manufacturing 
town, both communicating with Albany and Nciv Pork, ~-0u1d be 
subsidiary bases for supplies, which could bc poured along the Hudson 
rivci- and Canal, Lake Champlain, and thc roads and railroads all con- 
rerging on thc objcctiw point, Nontrcal; tho strongly fortified posi- 
tion of Rousc’s Point, at tho hcad of Lakc Champlain on tho fronticr 
within 40 miles of iUontrca1, bcing tho final point of concentration 
for attack upon Xontrcnl, tho dcfcncclcss comnicrcial and stratcgical 
capital of Canada, to which thc Vcrmont Ccntra! and a uctwork of 
othcr raihoads conycrgc. 
Pcrhaps no better proof of the absolutc ccrtaintF of 3lontreal as an 
objectivc, and no morc completc ides of thc inovitablo lines of thc 
Unitcd States mili tag operation, can bc gaincd than by a study of 
thc tn-entj-fire routes adrcrtiscd to thc Centennial Exhibition of 
1876. 
A glance a t  tlic rn!p bcforc thc construction of railwap S~IOIVS that 
tlic mountainous regions of thc Adirondacs, &c., tho Catskills on tho 
wcst, thc White JIountains and thc i~ggccl  tcrritory of BIainc on tho 
east, restrictcd communications to thc channels of tho Hudson, Lako 
Champlain, and thc Richclicu Vallcy, and will explain why history has 
so oftcn, and will again, repeat itself hero as clscwherc. Tho war-path 
of thc Iroquois and IIohnwk was follorcd by tho retaliatory expedi- 
tions of tho Frcnch Canadian soyagezrr soldiers, and then again by 
British, Colonial, and United Statcs invasions of Canada, down to 
thc last futilc effort of n Fcnian mob. Tho tidc of mar has over 
rolled dong thc channels that naturo and art linvc mado it shnro 
with commercc and trm-cl. The lately projcctcd Cnuglinawags 
Canal may, it is hoped, ncrcr bc coustructcd to admit’ United Statcs 
gunboats up thc Hudson from tho sca, and so complctc tho communi- 
cations of Lakc Champlain from Ncw York to the St. Lnm*encc 
for thc enemy d ~ o ,  having seized the Victoria Bridgc, and cstablishcd 
batteries on thc south bank of tho rivcr, couId bombard tho town. 
Tho wealthy commcrcid cIasses of 3Iontrcal would IIDLVC to pay n wry 
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74s THE 3IILITART ASPECT OF CASADA. 
heavy contribution towards the subjugation of their country. Canada 
would be cut in two by tho capture of Nontrenl, which is the head of 
the sea navigation of tho St. Lzwrence, and tho focus of a11 
communications by land and water between Upper and Lower 
Canada and thc maritime provinccs; the defence of tho country 
\yonl& bc severed; Ontario being cut off from Quebec and tht., 
maritimo provinces, as well as from any aid from Grcat Britain. &, 
cnclny holding Xontreal, with its nctwork of communications con- 
Tvrging upon it from his basis of supply, could easily maint3in him. 
self in thc natural fortress island on which the city is built, and con- 
tain any force coming from Ontario, hold tho communications to 
Ottawa, tho capital of the country, whilc thcx proceeded to lay &p 
to Qucbec. Thc St. Lawenco itself, with its tributaryof tho Richclieu 
Cannl and tho roads and railroads following the line of country in a 
north-eastern direction, xould bccomc fresh lines of mmmunication and 
supply, to an enemy operating against Quebec. If Quebec, Blontreal, 
and %&on were put in a proper state of defence, an enemy would 
bo obliged, in aiming :it tho sevcrnncc of communication bctircen 
Ontario and Quebec, tho maritimo provinces and Grcat Britain, to 
carry on thrco extensire expeditions simultaneously, eacli involring 
tho necessity of a protracted siege, and considering the short pcriod 
during which military opcrations on a large sealo can bo carried on in 
this country, thcre ivould bo every probability of successful resistanec. 
Unfortunately tho rcpeal in 187.2 by the Imperial and Dominion Par- 
liament of the Act of Confedcrntion cntitlcd tho Canada Dcfcnco Act, 
complicates the defcncs of Canada. Tho Act provided for tho gua- 
ranteed loan of 1,000,OOOZ. sterling, f o r  the building of forts round 
Nontreal, as well as the Free gift by the ImperiaI (3ovornment of an 
armament for such forts 11s might bo built a t  Xontreal, also a freo gift 
armament for the Qacbco and Levis forts, all of which mrc  declined 
by the Dominion Government, in farour of a transfer of tho guaran- 
teed loan of 1,000,OOOZ. to the Canada Pacific Railmay. 
Ceintrul Strutegic Points. 
After 3lontrea1, Quebec, and Kingston, perhaps the most important 
point is St. John's, Prorinceof Quebec, tho site of theold redoubt com- 
mands the milway bridge of the Vermont Central, the junctions from 
Rouse's Point, Waterloo, and tho Pussumpsic ; the Richelieu rirer canal, 
and thc roads running north and south, but tho advance guard of 
observation mould bc a t  Port Islc-aur-Noix, close to Rouse's Point and 
St. Albans railrond junction. "TO prevent tho enemy from passing 
'( vesscls down the Richelieu river from Lake Champlain, for tho 
'I transport of troops, stores, and material for  tho attack on Xontrcal, 
" obstructions (torpedoos) should he placcd in rho rirer on cither side 
" of, and flanked by tho fort a t  Isle-aux-Kois. This work and its 
'( gzrrison would no doubt, being in an adranced and isolated position, 
" be liable to be captured a t  an early period, but it is considcrcd that. 
" tho delay it would causc an cnemy would more than compensate for 
" thc loss that xould thereby bc occasioned." The garrison in TC- 
trcating might destroy the Canal Lock in tho Richelien river; Sir 
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TIIE VILITART ASPECT OF GAXAUA. ‘549 
Tvilliam Jcrrois also considcrs Sorel, at the mouth of the Richelieu, 
an important point. Adranced bodies of militia at Lennosvillc and 
Richmond Railway junction, aftcr keeping thc enemy in check, might 
retire upon Quebec, destroying the railway bridges behind them. 
6: It is further necessary to provide a p i n s t  attack upon Montreal by 
4s B forcc admncing from the westward, supposing it to haw crossed 
‘c the St. Lawrence, between Lake Ontario and Lakc St. Louis. This 
‘ 6  may beat be effected by t h  constraction of morks covering the rail- 
‘( way bridge near Vnudrcuil, a t  the junction of the Ottawa river with 
* c  the St. Lawcncc. Such works nmuld also act as a fife dzt pont, from 
‘ 6  undcr cover of which troops might opcrate .westward ; they rould, 
‘c moreovcr, be on tho flank of any forcc of the encmy advancing ap ins t  
6‘ Ottawa. I n  connection with tho defensire position a t  Vaudreuil, 
“ temporary works should be constructed on Isle Perrot, mhich, if 
*C  some of the spans of the railmay bridge bctwcen it and the main 
land n-crc rcmoved, would form a sccond linc of defence ; again, by 
removing some of the spans of the bridge betiseen Isle Perrot and 
‘6 BIontrcal Island, a third linc might be takcn up a t  St. Ann’s.” 
Bctwccn Vaudrcuil and the works immediately covcring JIontreaI, 
Lakc St. Louis and t h o  Lachino Rapids ~ o u l d  Ire a sufficient defence; 
gunboats could be brought into the lake by tho Lachine Canal, which 
is being widcacd. Any ~cssels  of war that werc brought into Lakc 
St. Louis mould also be of assistance in  the defence of the left flank of 
the works a t  Vaudrcuil ; and if  tlic St. Ann’s Lock and thc passage 
near it, bctn-ccn St. Louis and the Lakc of the TWO Mountains, were 
made sufficicntly largc to take such ressels through, they could also 
aid in the defence of tho right flank of those works. They could, 
morcover, operate in thc channel on the north side of Nontreal Island, 
or procccd up thc Ottawa nnd down the Ridcan Canal into Lakc 
Ontario. 
For the protection of communications by the Lnchinc R a i l ~ a y  and 
Canal, works should be constructed at Caugbnawagn, on the right 
bank of thc St. Lamcnce, nearly opposite tlic junction of thc Lachine 
Canal with Inkc St. Louis, and ncar the terminus of the railway from 
Platsburg. Thew works would also afford the menus of throwing a 
forcc across the river to act upon the Iefc flank of tho enemy operating 
agrainst Jlontrcnl, should circumstances be fnvourablo for such a move- 
mcnt, they could also guard against the entrance to the Beauharnois 
Canal. 
The Island of St. Helm’s, upon which rifled guns s5odd be mountcd, 
would form B keep to an  intrenched camp covering Ilontrcal and 
tlic ’Victoria bridge. On this island is also the main dopbt for tools, 
stores, guns, arms, and munitions of war for 3Iontre:tl and the neigh- 
bourhood ; it is unfortunately without protection since the barracks 
formerly occupied by a detachment from the Quebec Gunnery School 
wcre burnt. 3lany thousand stand of rifles, as well as a considerable 
amount of pomdcr in thc magazine, arc a t  tlic mercy of a handful of 
raidcrs, who might carry off tho arms and blow up the magazine 
before tho militia of Xontreal could be asscmblcd and transported 
across the river. 
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790 TEE XILITAR’S ASPECT OF OANADA. 
TIlc cultivated clnsses of thc United States arc friendly in fcelinm 
towards Great Britain, and tho Canadian population aro full of loyaltg 
whicli could bo at any timc rcndcrcd active in  thc dcfcnccof tho 
country, provided the principd cspenso and direction was taken by 
Great Britain, o r  thc Conncil of a fcdcmtcd Empire. 
Ofe?zce. 
Often tho best defcnco is offcncc, but Canada bcing a colony docs 
not contain Kithin herself thc clcrnents necessary to the initiative in 
war, thougli Zlcr localized militia system and tho cheracter of the 
country, which is LL riband of interior lines, land and matcr communi. 
cations, mould facilitate thc conccntration and launching of an offen- 
sit-0 forcc which might surpriso even 40,000,000 of unarmed pcoplo 
who haw hitherto relied upon thcir ever successful diplomacy. Par- 
liamentary GOT-crnmcnts are not, however, suitcd to a decisive initia- 
t i n  ; and when tho cspcnscs would haye to bo shared by tho Imperial 
and Dominion Gowrnmcnts, divided control ~ o u l d  bc a natural result, 
rcudcring initiatii-e perilous if n o t  impossible. Great Britain’s natural 
base of opcrations (thc sea) giws tho advantap of cnabling hcr to 
shift her secondary bases almost a t  will. A combined military and 
naval force, thcreforc, started from Canada a t  tho first dcclaration of 
hostilities might, by giving up thcir communications to the rear, 
push on to the Atlantic coast as Sherman did, and scizc an important 
seaport, t h r c  to co-o cratc x-iith thc British flcct which could support 
from India might land IL forcc of British troops and IL Sikh contingent 
on thc Pacific seaboard. 
them, and form a frcs K base for fnrthcr operations, while an espedition 
Part IL-XILITIA OF OAKADA, ACTIVE ASD RESEETE. 
I?re XiZitia Act. 
That the Nilitin, Law of Canada is SO thorough in its provisions, and 
tliat the keydono of thc arch of all military systcms, is., uniwrsal 
liability to military scrvicc, is not absent as in thosc of all other Anglo- 
Sason communities, is duo to tho traditions inherited from thc old 
Frcnch ~ & g h w ,  which -ere readily folloxcd by the dcsccndants of tho 
Unitcd Empirc Loplists,” who found thcmsclvcs for ever faca to 
face Kith thcir more numerous and wcalthy kinsmen from whom they 
had torn thcmsclvcs, often at the sacrificc of matcrial ~ c a l t h ,  for the 
sakc of adhcrcncc to thosc piincipks and that (‘ Dream of n Unitcd 
c c  Empirc ” which has not Set bcen renliscd, though a century has 
passcd awq.  Tho very history of thosc hcroic menhasbeen forgottcn, 
the initials of thcir distinctivc kitlc, U.E.L., bring no very clear pie- 
turc to tlio minds of thc majority of Englishmen to-day who, let us 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
or
th 
Ca
ro
lin
a C
ha
rlo
tte
] a
t 0
1:2
2 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
TEE JIILITrUtT ASPECT OF CASADA. 75 1 
hope bcforc it is yct too latc, may rcalisc the truc mcnning of a Unitcd 
Empire. 
Tlic thcorctically pcrfcct hIilitia Law, of Canada, though it may bo 
an csamplc of military legislation to us at homc, yctJ like crcry othcr 
lax, its practical rcsnlt dcpcnds upon its administration. Instcad of 
po t ing  thc rcrbiagc inscpnrablc from lcgal docnmcnts, I think I 
cannot do bcftcr than gi-rc yon the condcnscd rhs~iink taken from tlio 
u l i t i n  Act by Captain J. C. R.. Colomh, R.X.A., in his able papcr on 
6 '  The Naval and Nilitary Rcsonrccs of tlic Colonics," making somc 
erplanations of its practical workings. 
Clnsses of iuililia. 
'' Tho militia consists of all male in1inl)itants htirccn tho ages of 
I' 1st Class. BIcii from 38 to 30 years, who arc unmirricd 01% 
" 2nd Class. 3Icn from 30 to 45, ~ 1 1 0  arc married or \ridowcrs: 
'' 3rd Class. Ncn from 45 to GO. 
'' Tho abo-rc is tho ordcr in which tlic mnlc population is called 
'' npon to scr-ic.. 
" Thc Militia is dix-idcd into Activc and Rcscrrc. 
" Activc Nilitia consists of thc Voluntccr Xilitin, the Rcgulap 
' 6  Xilitin, and tho Xarinc Nilitia. Tho Voluntccr Biilitia bcing 
cc  composed of corps raised by rcluntary cnlistmcnt ; tho Rcgulnr 
'' Militia of mcn \rho haw -i-oluntarily cnlistcd to scrvc in tho same, or 
'' mlio have bccn bnllotcd* to scrrc; tlic Xarino Uilitia compcscd of 
'( scamcn, and pcrsons mhosc nsunl occupntion is upon any steam or  
'' sailing craft ; tho Rcscrro Militia consists of tlic wholc of thc moil 
'' who arc not soming in  tho Activc Militia for thc time bcing. Tho 
'' period of scrricc, in time of pcacc, in  tlic Voluntecr IGlitin IS t h e 3  
" Sears, in thc Rcgulnr and Marina Nilitia two years. BIcn cnrollcd 
" in tho scrricc companies of Regular or Narino Jlilitin during any 
'' such tmo p a r s  arc not again liablc to bc tnkcn for drill and training 
" until all tkc othcr mcn in  lst,  2nd, or 3rd Class of thc snmo ' com- 
" ' pany division' ham x-olnntccrcd or bccn bollotcd to scrrc. No 
'' rncmber of a, Voluntccr Xilitia corps can, in timc of pcacc, rcsign 
'( undcr six months' noticc." 
As thc ballot l~as  not bccn put in forcc sincc thc csistcnce of tho 
Act, tlic w-liolc of thc Activc Nilitia may be said to bc Voluntccr 
hlilitia, and thc term Rcgulnr Nilitin has no spccial meaning, unlcss i t  
bc applied to tho two battcrics of artillcry, "A" and "By" pcrmancntly 
cmbodicd, onc at Kingston and tho othcr a t  Qucbcc. Tlicy had no 
csistencc when the prcscnt Act, which did not contcmplatc tho with- 
drawal of thc Impcrinl troops, mas pnsscd. It has thercforc no prod- 
'6 18 and GO. It is diridcd into four classcs. 
midomrs without children. 
" with childrcn. 
1 Priblishcd in KO. CI of tho Journal, page 413, rt sq. 
2 Exemption on pro-ding a substitutc IJT p a p e n t  of 30 dohaa. 
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sions for the maintcnancc of rcgular troops, or tho threc years' pcrioa 
of enlistment now sanctioned for thosc corps) 
Tho Narine Militin unfortunately has no eristencc bcyond the fact 
of the nautical calling of individuals being notcd i n  the enrolment cf 
tllc Reserves vhich takes placc every five years. During Fenian raids 
BIilitia Artillen, with field guns, rerc placed on board lakc steamers. 
'I E~zrolnzeitf. 
'1 Camds is divided into 12 military districts; tliesc arc subdivirlccl 
6' into Brigadc and Regimental Dii-isions, and again into Company 
'I Divisions. 
L (  I n  each Regimental Dirisicn, o m  Licntcnant-Coloncl and t\vo 
JIxjors of Reserve Nilitin arc appointed from the residents therein? 
(' all Wlitia ordcrsand reports arc scnt to and received through thcm. 
I' In each Company Division one Captain, and onc Lieutenant, and 
': onc Ensign arc likcxisc appointed to thc Rescrac Militia. Thesc 
4' arc responsiblc by senioritr to thc regimental staff. EnroImcnt is 
carried on by Officers of Compnny Dkisions, and thc list is co~r?cted 
'' bcforc 28th Fcbruary every fifth scar ;  from thc company I (  !urns 
" thc regimental rolls arc made up. for which tho 
" company O@ccrs arc responsible is ' held to be an embodiment of 
" 'all thc Blilitinmrn cnrollcd, and renders them IiabIc to serve, 
'' ' unless exempt by law.' 
'c Exemptions : Jndgcs, clergy, ministers of rcligion, professors in 
" zolhges and uniaersitics, or teachers of rcligious ordcrs, 17-ardcn 
I' kccpers, p a r d s  of penitentiaries, officers, kcepcrs, and gunrcis of 
'' public lunatic asyIums, persons disabled by bodilF infirmity, and 
" ' the only son of a widow being hcr only support.' 
" Tho following, though cnrollcd, arc cscmptcd from active service, 
LL except in case of imr, invasion, or insurrection. Half-pay 05cci*s 
'I of Hcr .JIajcsty's Army and Xavy, sen-faring mcn, and sailors 
'' actually emplopd in thcir calling, pilots and apprentice pilots during 
'r tho Eeason of navigation, masters of public and common schools. 
1 These two batteries, or jiunnev schools as thej- nre calIed, wcrc first formed of 
Ofiiccrs and men selected from the Actire Xilitis ArtilIej. Tho Officcrs hclci 110 
commission esccpt in the corps from which they wcrc tnkcn, and tho men \rere not 
c~ilistcd cxccpt in their original rorps; but on entcring the sdloo~s of gunnery for 
onc jcnr. s c rc  re-enrolled for n further period of tllrcc Tears in thcir rcspcctivc 
corps. TLc serious inconwniencc of this course, from the fact of thc original corps 
sonictimcs bccoming non-cffcctii e bcforc the period of scrriec in the gunnerj- schools 
of Officcrs and men had expired, left such Officcrs and inen apparentIj- without 
I c p l  status. This WIS subscquently rcmcdicd bj- gmnting commisaions to tkc 
OUiccrs of A" and '*I? " battcrics, nnd enlistino the gunners in thosc corps. 
2 I t  is to be regretted that thcsc OfIiccr~ OF Resenc Jfilitia for tkc most part 
hare had no practical milita training n-hatcrcr, and hnrc not crcn passed through 
thc Actire Militia. I n  war Xcy irould be of little usc in organizing or leacling tlie 
inen thcy enrol. Their mili tav titlca would nt best be onlj- a sourcc of confusion. 
It may be mid in fnrour of the slstem that it is old, being a rclic of the old Frcnch 
fcudal s~steni, but it must be remembered that its succes3 dcpcndcd on thc sarlikc 
seigneurs who hnrc been improred nnnj-. It hns no doubt the odmntage of fncili- 
tnting cnrohcnt, and enlisting on thc side of Ioyalty and order some of the influen- 
tin1 lucn of countrj districts nll orcr tho Dominion. 
Thc ' enrolment 
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THE 3IILITARY ASPECT OF UASADB. 763 
". Her Najesty is empowered by the Act to make such regulations 
4' for the enrolment of such horses as may bc necessary for the purposo 
6' of field artillery and cavalry. 
'' The oath to bo taken by all ranks of Active Nilitia is simply as 
4' follom :-' I, A.  B., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be 
6' ' faithful and bear true allegiance to Her IIajesty.' It can be ad- 
" ministered by the Commanding Officcr. 
" Battotin$ 
'( When the Active 3Iilitia is to bo organized for drill or actual 
service and enough men do not rolunteer in any Company Division 
'' to complete the quota required from that Division, the men in the 
'' 1st class are balloted first ; if tho number of men required is greater 
'' than the whole number in  1st class, then the 2nd class is required 
'' to makc up tho deficiency, and so on through cach class; but at no 
'f timc-says the Act-' shall more than one son belonging to the 
' same family, residing in the same house-if there bo more than 
" ' one inscribed on the militia roll- be drawn, nnlcss tho number of 
*' ' names so inscribed be insufficient to complete the required propor- 
" ' tion of ser~ice men."' 
'r Oscers; Appointnient and Relative Rank. 
" Appointments of Officers to the Active hlilitia, are provisional, 
'I pending the taking out of a certificate of fitness from one of the ruili- 
1' tnry sckools of tho Dominion.' 
'' According to the Act, Oficers of Her Najesty's Regular Army are 
'' slways rcckoned senior to hlilitia Officers of the same rank, whaterer 
u be the dates of thcir respective commissions."z 
The Canadian Nilitia Act also provides that each of the twelve 
Deputy Adjutants-General of Districts " shall command thc Nilitia in 
'' his district."3 
The following paragraphs, 35 and 36 (which arc difficult to  reconcile 
d h  the prcvious mentioned), mould imply that the ordinary rule of 
the senior ORicer being entitled to command was intcndcd to hold good, 
as also the 185th Article of War. 
(35). '' The rclntivc rank and authority of Officers in the Nilitin of 
'( Canada shall bc tho same as tho relative rank and authoritr of 
" Ofliccrs in Her Majesty's Regular Army ; and any body of JIilitia 
" assembled on parade shall bc commanded by thc Officer highest in 
'( ixuk then present, on duty and in uniform, or the senior of two o r  
1 There are no caralry or infantry schools; the nppointmcnt of 05cers of those 
branches arc confirmed by boards of Xilitis Olllcers, though a few O5cers of 
caralry and infantv are occasionally nllomed to fill ramncics at tho artillerj schools 
wlierc an endearour i s  nladc to girc instruction in all nrm9. 
By D. late notitication in General Orders of tho Canada Guzette, O5cers of Xer 
Xajest ' 8  Reoular Army semirig with Canadian 'JIatis or l'oluntecrs, are not 
a l I o d t o  arzl tkrmsclrcs of their Army rank. 
3.But on occasions of emergency, when tho troops of one military district h a w  
bcen ordered into another, both Adjutants-General hare chimed the command. 
While in thc casc of tho apprehended riots at Jlontredat thefuneral of Xr. Guibord, 
the line betaecn tTo inilltars districts runnine through the cits, the head-quarters 
of thc troops being at onc side, \rliile the ccmetery nns on the othcr, the command 
of the force should hare becn changed at certain apot on the line of march. 
mL. SSIII. 3 E  
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754 T I E  3IILITARS ASPECT OF CAXAD.1. 
'( more Officers of equal mnk; proyidcd that no Officcr whoso rank iq 
'6 prol-isional only shall under any circumstances command an Officer 
C I  of thc samo grado ~vlvhosc rank is substantirc." 
(36.) '6 Ofiiccrs of Hcr Najcsty's Regular Army shall alwnys bC 
~6 reckoned senior to Nilitin O5cers of thc same rank, wliatcvcr bo the 
6' dates of thcir respectire commissions." 
8 '  Tllc prcscnt law permits tlic training annually of IL number not 
$ 6  escccding 45,QOO a11 ranks. Thc training period for  Actiro Xilitia, 
( 8  called out for training, is not to cscccdlG, nor to bo less thm 8 d g s  
'' in  any one par .  
Non-commissioned officers and priratcs of mounted corps recci-q 
g c  for cach day's drill of thrcc hours, 75 cents for cach horsc that has 
c c  taken part in  tho drill; and crcry Officer and man of thc Regular 
g g  and BIarino Militia, and thc O5ccrs of Rcservo Militin, called out 
'6 for training, reccirc 50 cents for cadi day's drill. Payment for drill 
I' is madc on proof of complinncc with regulations touching thc drill 
'' and cfiicicncy of thc scrcral corps, 
" Thc Xilitia, or any part of it, may bc calIcd ont for  ' actual scr- 
" vice,' cithcr within or  without the Dominion,l whencrcr it appears 
'' advisablc to do so by reason of war, invasion, or insurrection, or 
'' danger of any of them, and when so called out, it ma7 bc placed by 
c c  Her Najesty nniler tlic ordcrs of thc Commanclcr of Hcr lhjcsty's 
" Rcgnlnr Forces in Canada, and will bc paid a t  such rates of daily 
'' pay ns m e  paid in Her BInjesty's Scrvicc. 
Officcrs aud mcn, when cnllcd out for nctnal scrvice, 2nd also 
(' dnring the period of annual training, or during drill or parailc of 
'' their corps, or as spectators, or wliilc twnring uniform, arc subject to 
" tho rules and Articlcs of War, and Blntiny Act, thc Queen's RcguIn- 
'' tions and Orders for the Army, and all other laws thcn oppliciblc to 
' l  Her Najestj's traops in Canada, and not inconsistent with tho 
k6 Canadian Act." 
" Cosmaitd in Chi$. 
" By tho 15th section of the British Xorth Amcrican Act, 18G7, 
" the Command in Cliicf of Land and N a r d  Xilitin was rcstcd in 
' I  tlic Qnecn, to bc escrciscd and administcrcd by Her Najcsty per- 
sonalls, or by the Govcrnor as hcr rcprescntatirc. 
" Tho Blinister of Nilitia is chargcd with and rcsponsiblc for  thc 
" administration of Nilitin affairs, including all mattcrs inyolving 
'I cspcnditure, and of tho fortifications, gunboats, ordnancc, ammu- 
'I nition, arms, armourics, stores, &c. 
" Tbc Gowrnor may appoint D Deputy Xinistcr and such other 
" Officers as may be necessary. 
'' Tho Adjutant-General of Xilitin for the Dominion of Canada 
'( sl~all bc a person educated to tho military profession and mbo has 
'I attained thc rank of a Ficld Officcr in Her Jlajesty's regular Axmy. 
Tlic Nilitia can bc callcd out in aid of thc ciril poncr on 3 writtcn rcqiiisition 
by tlic ninxor or ang two mngiitmtca in any municipality in aliich n riot takcs pbcc, 
and tlic OfIiccr in command i b  to ohcy Eucli instructions 3s may bc hafully gircn 
him by any mugistrote in rcgard to  such riot. A diffcrcnco of opinion bctmcn the 
mngi5tmtcs puts the Officcr commanding in an nmknnrtl position. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
or
th 
Ca
ro
lin
a C
ha
rlo
tte
] a
t 0
1:2
2 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
TEE JIILITAP ASPECT OF CAIIADB. 755 
G I  Hc shall haw! tho rank of ColoneI in tho Nilitia and shall be charged, 
G C  ander tho orders o f  Her Xajesty, with the military command and 
c~ discipline of the IIilitia.” A Dcputy Adjutant-Gcncral of Nilitin is 
n l s ~  provided for a t  head-quarters, as .crcll as a Dcpnty Aajutmt. 
General and Staff for Cad1 of the 12 mi1itar.r districts. 
Her ahjcsty may further appoint Staff Ofliccrs of the JIilitia with 
rank as from t h o  to time may bc found rcqnisite or  necessary 
for tlic cficicney of t h  3Iilitia service, but in no easo to  cscced that  
of Jlajor-General. 
The nbovc is an outlinc Of tho legal enactments on mhieli the Xilitia 
of Canada rests. 
The Xilitin. 
Tho hcad-quarters of military districts arc marked on the map, also 
positions of field and garrison batteries axid permanent militia 
garrisons. 
Ontario is divided into 4 military districts. 
No. 1 BIilitary Distl:ict comprises Western Ontario, with its head- 
quarters at  London. 
Infantry.. .. 
Cavalry.. ... 
Artillery.. 
11 bathlions and 2 independent companies;. 
1 regiment of 4 troops. 
2 field batteries. .. { 2 prrison batteries. 
No. 2 Nilitary District, at the mcstcrn end of h k o  Ontario, with 
its head-quarters nt Toronto. 
Infantry ...... 
Cavalry ....... 
Artillery { 2 garrison batteries. 
15 battaIions and 1 indcpcudent company, 
Goyemor-Geneid’s body p a r d ,  9 troops ; 
3 ficld batteries. 
with mountain guns. 
1 regimcnt, 7 troops. 
...... 
Engineers ..... 1 compnnF 
No. 3 Xilitary District, cast cnd of Lake Ontario, with head-quarters 
a t  Kingston. 
Infantrr ........... 10 battaliom. 
Cavalry ............ 2 regiments. 
2 ficld batteries. { 4 garrison batteries. ........... Artillery 
KO. 4 Blilitary District, Eastern Ontario, viith head-quartcrs a t  
Brockvillc. 
Infantry.. .... 
Cawlry ...... 
Artillery (1  garrison battery. 
G battalions and 3 independent companies. 
2 troops (Governor-General's Dragoon Guards, 
2 field battcrios. 
1 troop). 
...... 
Tho Province of Qucbcc is divicled into 3 military districts. 
KO. 5 BIilitary District, that  portion of .the vestern end of the pro- 
3 ~ 2  
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7.5 G TRE XILITART ASPECT OF UAXADA. 
vince and southern frontier, mainly inhabited by English Canadians 
head-quarters, Nontreal. 
Infantry.. .... 14 battalions and 3 independent companies. 
CavaIry ...... 1 regiment (3 troops), and 5 independent 
3 field batteries. 
Artillery . { garrison, 1- brigade of 6 battcries and 
Engineers .... 2 companies. 
troops. 
1 independent battery. 
No. G Xilitary District, head-quarters, Xontreal. (French Canadian 
troops.) 
Infantry.. .. 
Cavalry .... .Nil. 
Artillery . . nil. 
7 battalions and 10 independent companies. 
No. 7 3Iilifary District, with head-quarters a t  Qncbec, mired 
English and French Canadian troops, mainly tho latter, estcnds to tho 
Atlantic, along both sides of the St. Lawrence. 
Infantry .......... 14 battalions, 
Caralry ............ 1 squadron. 
ArtilIery 1 field battery. .......... { 3 garrison batteries. 
No. 8 Military District comprises Now Brunswick, wit11 head- 
qunrters at Frederickton. 
Infantry .... 
Artillery 
5 battalions and 4 independcnt companies. 
2 field batteries. 
Cavalry .... 1 regiment. 
Engineers.. . 1 company. 
Infantry .... 9 battalions. 
Artillery. ... 2 brigades garrison artillery (6 batteries 
.... 1 brigade garrison artillery (9 batteries). { 
Xo. 9 Nil i tay District, Nova Scotia. 
Cavalry .... { 1 troop. 
1 field battery. 
each), and 5 independent batteries. 
No. 10 Nilitnry District, i\lanitobn, head-quarters, Winnipeg. 
Infantry ........ 2 independent companies. 
Artillery ........ 1 ficld battery. 
xo. 11 Jlilitary District, British Columbia, head-quartcrs, Vic- 
f oria, British Columbia. 
Infantry ........ 5 independent companies. 
Artillery ........ 2 garrison batteries. 
Infantry ...... 3 battnlions. 
Artillery ...... 4 batteries garrison artillery. 
Enginecrs.. .... 1 company. 
No. 12 XiIitary District, Prin-e Edward Island. 
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THE 3LILITARY ASPECT OF C.KYADA. 757 
The battalions consist usually of 6 or 8 companies of 40 bayonets. 
The number of Officers has lately been reduced to 2 per company, 
Khich does not allom of drill being properly carried out with right 
md left guides. 
Tho cavalry, 40 sabres per troop, 
The field battery, 70 gunners, and non-commissioned officers. 
Tho garrison battery, 40 gunners and non-commissioned officers ; 
makhg a total of about- 
Infantry ............ 37,000 
Ca-ialry ............. 1,800 
Field artillery ........ 1,350 
Garrisonartillery.. .... 3,000 
Engineers.. .......... 315 
__L 
43,3651 
Only about half these numbers have been drilled during the pjst 
t x o  years, the Nilitin estimates having been reduced by about one- 
half. On this point, and everything connected with his command, 
Lieutennnt-General Commanding Sir Selby Smyth, has furnished a 
most complete and exhaustive report, which I cannot do better than 
quote and recommend you to read for further information. He states :n 
'( When first I came to Canada, I believe the Parliamentary grant 
for the Nilitirt, nmounted to about a million and ;t half of dollars per 
'' annum, and with that sum the 48,000 men annually trained in 
" brigado camps for the full period allowed by lam. Tbc following 
'( and each succeeding yenr the voto was decreased, until last year it 
'I amounted to less than one million dollars, out of which the mainte- 
'( nance of the Royal Military Collego and the North-West Mounted 
c L  Police haw become a charge upon it. Therefore the paid training 
'' of the Alilitia has been reduced to a minimum, only one-half the 
'( force being embodied for twelve days' drill in each year, and such 
'< training as that amounts to is almost useless, being really littlc more 
'( than an armed muster at battalion and company head-quarters. 
" The Militia grant last ycnr mas csactly 931,956 dollars, from 
' I  rhich dednct 306,356 dollars for North-West Nounted Policc, and 
" 50,000 dollars for tho Royal Military College, leaving somcshat more 
'( than half-a-million dollars for militin purposes proper, and the 
I' supply of all warliko stores. 
'' The supply of military stores talrcs n considerable portion of this 
(' grant. It comprises clothing for the whole forcc, whichhas to  be fre- 
" quently rencwed, and for the tmo gunnery schools, ts ice  a, year,3great 
" coats, rifles andmaterial for their repairy ammunition, field a d  garri- 
'' son guns, saddlery, gunpowder, as well as accoutrements and equip- 
1 These numbers of coursc do not includc tho Impcrinl garrisons nt Ifnlifar ; nor 
arc t h o  tKo pcrmnent Camdisnnrtillery garrisons of Quebec and Kingston included 
in thc militia strength of thc districts. 
2 Z'de Report on thc Stnteof the UilitiB of the Domirion of Can& for the p a r  
1676, page 14, e t  mq. 
On@ suit of cloth, one of serge, per annum, vith an olloaancc to keep up winter 
undcrclotl&g. 
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75s THE JlILITIRT ASPECT OF GASADA. 
'6 mcnts of crcry dcscription that an army rcquircs. So  that in fact, aftcr 
6' (lcdncting, bcsidcs salaries, p y  for drill instruction to Captains, 
6' storckccpcrs, rcnt for armourics and storehouses, iucl light 
6' artiIlciy and rifle association nllowallccs, band pq, targets, dpili 
IL sheds, riflc rangcs, and contingcncics for general sci=vicc not ottlcrmisc 
6' proFidcd fo?, thcrc remains for thc drill pay and incidcntal ~ ~ p p ~ ~ ~ ~  
6' attendant on drill and training, only tllc mcngrc nnd insufficient sum 
'' of 155,000 dollars, or about 30,0001. s tding.  This sum is quite 
'' inadequate to kccp tlic 43,000 BIilitia of Canada in a propcr state of 
'( training and effectiveness, amounting approsimatc17 to the annul 
What progcss can a 
" Gcncral Officcr make in this casc? Hc can o d ~  feel himsclf a source 
6' of disappointment to thc cxccllcnt and loyal body of Officers and 
66 mcn nndcr his command, who look to him for support." 
Geacral IZcniarks. 
Givcn tlie cvcry-day life of D .people and their physical surround, 
ings, and it is not difficult to form n truc cstimatc of tlic charactcr of 
its soldicrs, cspccially whcn they arc a national army and not tho 
product of o m  or tn.0 classes or strata of socictr. Pcrhaps the had- 
ing characteristic of all Canadians is sclf-rcliancc, a splcndicl military 
quality, cspccially in tho mnli and filo during war, bot capablc of 
cxtrcme dcvclopmcnt among thc Officers of all voluntccr forces even in 
pcacc. 
cost of a sin& British battalion of tlic linc. 
6,fnlltry. 
Tho genciyd characteristics of tho population of great citics nee 
much tho snmc cvci-jwhcrc. They arc mom intclligcnt, but leks 
robust, than tho rural  population; they readily acquiro a militaty 
mrriagc, prccision, and smartness i n  drill; their uniforms arc bctter 
fitted, thcir arms and nccoutremcnts in bcttcr ordcr, and thcir corn- 
pnntivcly wcaIthy Officers Fro willing to assist liberally in producijg 
theso rcsults, which, aftcr all, .go some way towards rcal cfficicncy. 
But in D scrions stmgglc thc backbonc of Canada would, I bclievc, 
bc found in tho rural battalions. 
A vcry large proportion of thc farming population cngngcs in 
Iumhering during thc n-intcr. 
Hc who has livcd among thcsc gcninl stalwart lumbcrmcn, s1iarc.d 
their slianty and thcir bivouac in mintcr and in carly spring, wllcn 
they drit-e the logs along thc icy torrcnts and head rnatc1.s of thcir 
moodcd v-ildcmess, cannot but bc irnprcsscd with tho bclicf that  hc  is 
among Xatnrc's soldicrs of tho w r y  best typc. 
130 they EngIish or Frcnch Canadin, thcrc is not, I bclievc, fincr 
stuff for soldicrs among any population in the world, mhilc tho hzbits 
of organization and supply of tlic various Iumbcr camps at thc? cs- 
trcmity of long lincs of difficult communication nro n Qunrtcrmajtcr- 
Gcncral's department in miniature. Again I must quotc Sir p l b y  
S q t h  for the gist of the whole matter as to tkc difficulty of traming 
such men undcr prcscnt conditions :- 
'I Fortunately for thc country the battalions arc commandc4 and 
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THE XILITART ASPECT OF CAXADA. 759 
*( in gcneral officcrcd, by gcntlcmcn of zcalous patriotism and strong 
g '  military proclivities, and in thc various citics tlicy ha~w continued to 
1' asscmblc their men for. unpaid drill as often as possible in tlic long 
( 6  and unoccupied wintcr cvcnings. Thcrcforc city battalions and 
' 6  corps of all arms are in an cfiicicnt state, but country battalions 
6;  arc, owing to thc abscncc of such opportunities and facilities, less so. 
( c  Howxcr, they arc fairly drilled too. They arc fully armed, clothcd, 
" nnd cqnippcd. Thcy nrc proficient in tho usc of tlicir rifles, being 
6' as a rulc capital shots: and a fern weeks would sufficc to placc tlicm 
6' crcditably in line with any troops. 
" The training of rural battalions a t  company hcad-quarters for 
'( t b c c  sncccssim years has not resultcd in much good. Thc majority 
6' of the men reside on farms at D distance from thcir company head- 
'& qnnrtcrs, and w-lion callcd on to drill tkcy haw to givo up thcir day's 
$ 6  work and that of thcir horses, receiving only fifty cents in  lien. 
'' Thcreforc t h y  arc naturally anxious to shortcn the pcriod by per- 
' r  forming two days' driI1 in one, and so the work is hnrricd over in o 
'' pcrfnnctory fasliion ; tlic drill instructor, who drams his forty dollars 
4' n year as such, possibly having learnt but littlc of thc rndiments of 
'( drill, disciplinc, or regimental economy. A Icoscness and laxity of 
(' systcm thcrcforc occurs vliich does not conduct to thc first prin- 
t (  ciples of training a soldier. It has becn brought to my noticc that 
'' rural corps ordered out for training arc freqncntly composcd of 
" about onc-half rccruits, showing that men oftcn join for on0 train- 
'( ing only, with no dcsiro to carry out thc tcrms of thcir thrcc years' 
'' enlistment nnlcss it be convcnicnt. Officers commanding companics 
'< are in fault for this; tlicy nrc responsible for thcir companies nuder 
" tho csisting law is they should not cnrol men unlcss they know them 
'' m-cll, thcir cmploymcnt, thcir placc of rcsidence, and wlicthcr they 
*( arc likcly to fulfil thc provisions of thc Act. They arc too lcnicnt 
'' with their mcn, and to sare tlicmsclves troublc or  pcrhaps unpopu- 
' I  larity, or evcn politics may hcrc again interpose, thcy cnrol ncw 
'' hands rather than proceed by law a p i n s t  tlic old oncs to compcl 
" tlicrn, nndcr tlie penalties of the Militia Act, to  fulfil their tcrms of 
'' cnrolmcnt. All this rcquircs looking into and a thorough rcforma- 
'( tion. Enral corps ham the disadvantagc of such long distances 
" bctween tlicir compnnics that thc Licntcnant-Colonel, who lias of 
" conrsc his daily busincss to attcnd to, can hardly supcrvisc their 
" dctnils; and it mny liappcn that tho Staff OEccrs xho makc thc 
" mustcr and tlic half-j-carly inspcetions do not alvays, as n rulc, t a la  
'' minuto noticc of what has on tho surface an appcarancc of bcing ' all 
'( ' correct.' 
"Rural cornpanics should bc always clrillcd at battalion h a d -  
" quarters. 
1 Coloncl Gzowslri, by liis cuergctic and libcrd presidency of thc Dominion R a e  
Association, ha3 contributcd much to thc shooting ciEcicncy of thc infantry of the 
Dominion. 
2 Thc lax girc3 a loop-holc in allowing any man to claim discharge after six 
month' notice. Ife a n ,  and somctirncs does, girc notice immediately after k i ~  Grst 
training, and cannot in that casc bc made to attcnd another. 
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760 TIE JIILITARY ASPECT OF CISAD-I. 
'( In tlie same degree -that rural company drill works badly that of 
'' city corps does well, because men can asmnble in long minter even- 
" ings in  the drill-sheds without loss of pay, and they I O O ~  upon their 
tr drill and lectures as a recreation. 1 have every year opposed tho 
6 '  q-stem of rural company drill: it has the effect of circulating somo 
't money through the locality, and they may be convenient and satisfy 
" local interests ; it also brings a body of men together, armed and 
6' equipped for a time. But in my opinion it wastes more arms and 
6' equipments and clothing than any good that can result from it, and 
I shall disband overy independent company not affiliated to a bat- 
'( talion, except in Xanitobo and British Columbia; and I should 
'6 suggest, if po?sible, in future to abstain from annual drill at corn. 
" pany head-quarters, unless the Captain holds a first.class certificato 
" for drill and rifle instruction. 
" This leads mo to revert to the subject I have so often before dwelt 
upon-the necessity for some regimental pcrmancnt staff. Tho 
'6 militia of Great Britain has, according to regimcntal strength, trm 
" Officers and from 30 to 36 staff sergeants, who ore thorough drill 
instructors ; the Quartermaster being charged with the cnro of 
(' arms and clothing, which are thus kept in order, and no  loss from 
& '  neglect or theft permitted. In fact, it is a delusion to bcliove that 
" an efficient military force can exist in perfection xithout a trained 
'6 permanent staff, xu pnprofitablc expenditure of public money being 
' 6  often the consequence of dispensing Kith it." 
Cavalry. 
I venture to doubt diether  Canado could supply so largo or cffi. 
cient a body of cavalry as has becn by somc imagined, ~ h o  ignoro the 
fact that Canadians are not a nation of horsemen. Toronto, Ottawa, 
Montreal, and Quebec are tho only places where foxhounds are fol- 
lowed. The long, hard winter necessitates driving in a ndl-furred 
sleigh rather than riding, and in summer fast-trotting sulkies arc more 
prevalent than hacks. Nevertheless the Feoman cavalry of Ontario 
nnd along the United States frontiers of Quebec and Nen- Brunswick 
liaro before now done good serrico as outposts : the c p s ,  ears, feelers 
and veil of an army. 
They have ablo and enthusiastic cavalry lcadcrs in such men as 
Colonel Dennison, of Essq celebrity, ColoncIs Forsyth, Turnbull, 
Lovelace, Saunders, and others. 
The country troops are of course rough in  appearance compared to 
thoso of cities, who hare more opportunities for dismounted drills, 
while their saddlery and appointments are kept in better order. The 
i.ural troops from their hmowledge of the country are of course better 
scouts. 
Artillery. 
The artillery is pcrhps the arm in which the natural military pro- 
clivities of Canadians appear at their best. Their efficiency compared 
with the short period of training has becn a constant source of sup- 
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THE MILITARY ASPECT OF UAXADA 761 
prise to me. The practical mobility of the field artillery of small 
country towns is due to its pepularit.yamong the sons of yeomen 
farmers who enrol their own pair of horses and enlist as drivers. 
Thcir first appearance would perhaps bc painful to the hypercritical 
glancc of a Iloral Artilleryman, but familiarity would teach him that, 
give them time, and they mill get their guns almost anywhere for you ; 
their Officers would select good positions, and the fire, judging by their 
target practice, mould be very fairly effective. The cities naturally pro- 
duce the most intelligent gunners, as the rural districts do the best 
driwrs. The system of selecting artillery marksmen fostered by thc 
Dominion Artillery Association, and introduced into the Canadian 
Militia before it oxistcd in England, has, I think, produced very good 
results. I trust I may bc excused for quoting rnr own report which 
gives a re'szmik of thc subject :- 
lktrciets froin Report of the Doiniizion Iiiqiector of Artillery. 
'' Field Artillerg Generally. 
'L Considering tho small cost to the Govxnmcnt,and the consequent 
" short period alloffed for training-16 days-I consider the Gana- 
" dian Militia Field Artillery in a remarkable state of c5ciency. I 
" trust the number of horses will bc increased to six per gun, with 
" thrce spare in  case of accidents, making D totd of 45 horses per 
" batterj. The issue of blnck leather gaiters up to the knee and 
" strapped spurs to mounted non-commissioned officers and men, 
" thOKI$I appsrcntly D trifling matter, rould tend much to eflicicncy ; 
" thc trousers, often withont straps, wrinkle up towards the knees, 
'& unsiglitly in appearance; they vould gall the leg of II man riding 
" a n j  distaucc. The deficient nnd irregular supply of whips and spurs 
" renders good driving impossible, and has been a source of accident as 
" a t  Hamilton, Ont., when n gun team going up n steep incline could 
" not be kept up to the collar, and were prccipitnted down a declirity, 
in  this instance, fortunately without loss of life. 
" Instead of tlic importation of the cumbrous ammunition mgons, 
" I would recommcnd tlic adoption of a system of an enlarged limbcr 
" supply as more handy, with fewer horses and less difficulty in driving, 
' I  kc., as proposcd by JIajor Ellis, R24. 
" The Dominion &*tillcry Association has, I think, by producing'a 
" spirit of emulation, been largely conduciw to tho prcscnt efficiency 
"'of the field artillcry, while the system of efficiency badges for unpaid 
" drills has been largely condncivc of good resiilts, especially to the 
" artillery in cities and towns. A complete Field Battery of Instruc- 
tion a t  each of the gunnery schools is absolutely nccessar;v before 
'' instruction in field movements can be given." 
In spite of the v q -  able essay of Najor Eolmcs, Adjutant of t ho  
Kingston Gunnery School, I would not recommend D large increase to 
the Xilitis field artillery, but mould prefer to see what is a t  present 
organized giren double tho period of drill-32 d a p  instcad of 16- 
and a proper equipment of ammunition wagons or limbers 1ssned. 
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7G2 TIIE JIILITARP ASPECT OF CJUADA. 
Tho greatly incrcascd mngc and cfficicncy of infadry fir0 docs in 
my opinion, point to thc ad-&ability of incrcasing our proportion of 
guns to infantry as formcrly laid do- in Europc. The closc cI1aractc, 
of tllc country and the bndncss of roads in Canada vould not, in my 
opinion, justify any lnrgc incrensc of ficld artillcv. Better to rendcr 
t~orougldy cGcicnt what mc hacc got. Indiffcrcnt artillcry or cvcn 
good artillery badly liandlcd is only nn incnmbrancc. 
It might bc thought advisable to equip a fcri battcrics mitli mitrail. 
Icurs, firing thc same ammunition as tlic infantry, to act with cavalry 
and cnnNc them to scizc and hold an important point; but until some 
manufactory for small-arm ammunition is establishcd in Canada, it 
mould bc rash to start an armamcnt that mould call f o r a  larger 
rcscryo of what ric liavc to import a distance of 4,000 milcs, viz., small- 
arm ammunition. 
TVith regard to tho garrison artillcry, I must again quota my on-n 
report and that of my Assistant-Inspcctor, Licutcnant-Coloncl Price 
Iic\r*cs :- 
(' Garrison Artillery Genernlly. 
With thc csccption of thc Ilontrcal and St. Jolm, N.B., Brigades 
bf Garrison Artillcrj., I haw found tho garrison artillery in a F C ~ T  
'c incfficicnt condition, mainly, I bolicvc, for  want of a wcapon on tho 
'' cffiwcy of which thc-j can rcly, ns thcy cannot on thc old smooth- 
(' bores that cumbcr our works and drill shcds. The introduction of 
'c Sir William PaUiscr's comparatively incspcnsivc system of convert- 
'' ing om- old cannon into rifles in Canadiau workshops, a t  a cost of 
'' 1201. cncli, thc cost of tho importcd Palliscr gun bcing 1601. csclu- 
sivc of frcight, is, in my opinion, tho only tangiblc and pcrmancnt 
means of givin-g efficiency to this important branch of thc Ecrvicc, 
" cspccially in citics wlicro both thc industry, the guns, and thc gun- 
'( ncrs, arc most necdcd; and whcrc intelligcnt mcclinnics may be 
'' found to form enthusiastic nr t i l l c rpen  to man the guns tlmy fcrgc 
(' in  tho dcfcncc of thc city whcrc thcy livc. Judging by vdiat lias 
'I takcn placc i n  Grcat Britain, tlicso rcsults arc not ncccssarily 
'' visionary for Canada. Haring commanded tlic Gunnery School for 
'( Rcscrrc Artillcry a t  Woolwich, from its inception until I loft 
(( for Canada, it mas my duty to rccommcnd tlic adoption of tho 
I' Palliscr 64-pounder for the Rcscrrc Artillcry of Grcat Britain. 
" Tlic immediatc intcrcst ronscd by this substttution (for ' tho old 
'' gas-pipe guns,' as tho obsolctc weapons ricrc somcwhnt irrcvcrcntly 
stylcd by tho mcn who were snpposcd to fight thcm) raised tho 
'' cfiicicncy of tho forcc in a mauuer incrcrliblc to one who did not 
" witness it. Tho homo Rcscrvc Artillcry of Grcat Britain mustcrs 
(' 60,000 fairly trained gunncrs in  addition to tho regular rcscrvcs of 
'' tlic Royal Artillcry. I mould carncstly plcad for tho oxtension of 
" the systcm to this part of tho Empirc." 
Lieutenant-Coloncl Pricc Lcn-es reports :- 
" I rcgrct to find i n  tho Halifax &ill shcd no stores for shifting 
'I ordnansncc cxcroiscs j in fact no npplianccs nhcrcmith to instruct o r  
" interest the artillcrymau in his work bc-jond a fcm 32-pounder 
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TIlE NILITa\RY ASPECT OF CAXAD.1. 763 
6'  smooth-borc guns mountcil on traversing platforms. Tlic Brigades 
6 '  of Halifax Artillcrs contain tlic matcrial for as fino a forco of 
( 6  garrison artillcry as could bc dcsircd j but if thc most orrlinary 
i' applianccs for iiistruction (which i n  England arc posscsscd by tho 
' 6  smallest rolnntecr artillcry corps) arc not givcn them a high statc 
6'  of cfficicncy cannot bc cxpcctc'd. I trust this dcficicncy may bo 
rcmedicd, cspcciklly as rcgnrds Halihnr and St. Jolin, N.B., a t  both 
'( of which plnccs arc crccllcnt drill slieds, and I fecl confidcnt that 
" tlic rcsults in incrcascd cfficicncj- will amp13 jnstify thc trifling 
I' outlay rcquircd for tlic fcm storcs rcfcrrcd to. Tlicsc brigades have 
u not carriccl out thcir nniiunl gun practice, owing to tho ammunition 
'6 ha-i-ing only very rcccntly bccn rcccivcd, and I should rccommcnd 
that, as thc wintcr scason LTS sct in, thc ammunition be rctaiucd 
t r  until thc spring, and thcn uscd for  cornpctitirc practice." 
I n  my own rcport I find the follon-ing :- 
" Ziigimxrs. 
'I This brancli of tlic BIilitia is sadly in  want of matcrinls, and 
'( mcaas of instruction. Thcy arc without cntrcncliiug tools and tllc 
'' common npplianccs of thcir arm. Licutcnant-Colonel Scoblc a t  
" Toronto, IIajor Kcnncdy at Xontrcal, and Captain Pcrlcy a t  St. 
" John, N.B., arc able and zcalous Oficcrs, anxious to produce cffi- 
" cicncy, if thc means wcrc available. 
'' Tho tKo cngincer cornpanics a t  Nontrcal might with advantagc 
'' bc placcd under tho senior Officer of tho arm at 3lontrcal. 
" I was not notified by any of thc Dcputy Adjutants-Gcncral of thc 
" districts of tlic proposcd datcs of inspection of cngincer corps, and 
'( have tlicrcforc hail no opportunity of judging accurately, but from 
" want of the npplinnccs bcforc mcntioncd, and from previous inspcc- 
" tions of somc of tlic compxnics, I bclicoc tlicm to bc little mom than 
'I cfficicnt infantry. The Toronto Enginccrs, Lieutenant-Coloncl 
'' Scoblc, liavo to a ccrtain crtcnt, 1 am informcd, supplied matcrial a t  
" tlicir own cspcnse." 
They arc vcry zcaloiis and ilcscrvc gimt commcndation and somo 
assistancc from Govcrnmcnt, but I am not of opinion that, consiclcring 
tlic v c r y  small sum of moncy voted for the BIiIitin, it would be 
advisable to horsc and establisli so costly an institution as a pontoon 
train. Espccially do I not think the gnmc worth thc eendlc in  Canada, 
on the banks of whosc forest rivers and streams for thc most part me 
found thc means of crossing, which a gang of lurnbcr-mcn mould very 
soon knock into a bridgc or raft, with extra flotation if rcquircd from 
cmpt-y pork, flour, pctrolcuni, or whisky barrels, which must bc found 
where men congrcgntc, or a t  all erelitsin tlic storcs of an army. Thoro 
is no organization for thc tiansport and supply of ammunition in tlic 
ficld, 11 qucstion of vital importance in these days of brccch-loaders. 
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TIIE JIILITART ASPECT OF CANADA. 
Wednesday, Nay 7,1879. 
~XJTENAST-GENERBL SIR JOHN H. LEFROY, K.C.N.G., C.B., R A ,  
&c., &c., in the Chair. 
Part II.-PERMANESTLT ENBODIED TROOPS AXV ~ ~ L I T A R Y  EDUCATIOSAL 
ESTAGLISIIXEXTS OP CA ADA. 
When the Imperial legions were withdrawn from Quebec, the last 
and most important stronghold of Canada proper, to me was confided 
the honour of forming a garrison of loynl Canadians to guard the Im. 
perial iiag that still floated over the ancient fortress.’ A similar task 
derolved upon Captain G. T. French, R.A., nith respect to  Kingston? 
How we have performed those duties is I believe being recognised by 
conferring on tlic Officers and soldiers we hare trained during seren 
laborious years the honourable title of “ Ropd Canadian Artillery.” 
What  that labour was, can best be judged by an1 professional soldier 
picturing to himself the task of raising and training an artillery garrison 
nnd rc-arming a fortress without professional assistants,1 as well as form- 
ing and conducting a theoretical and practical school of all arms, as 
may bc understood on reference to the curriculum of subjects taught. 
The scholastic monotony has been varied by the necessity for using my 
pupils to suppress civil distnrbances, but cires ncqicirit ezcndo. To the 
assistance given by Naster Gunner Donaldson, R.A., and the sergeant 
gunnery instructors, I am indebted, but the credit is mainly due to tho 
good material I had to work upon, i.e., thc gentlemen selected as Offi- 
1 It rras a curious coincidence that the two regiments first to enter Quebec after 
its capitulation w r c  the last to lcdre i t  more than a century after. To an Olficcr 
and detachment of the H o p 1  Artillery, cscortcd by the Goth l<ojal American Rifles, 
was gircn tlic honour of hoisting the British flag at  the conquest. On thc with- 
clrawil of the Imperial garrison from Qucbcc, to  an Officer of the Roja l  Artillery, 
x~as  handed orer, by n detaclimcnt of tlic Royal Artillerj and 60th Rilles, the flag, 
which I ham no doubt my Canadian militarj clddrcn n ould honourably defend, if 
need bc. 
2 Lieutenant-Colonel French subscquentlr organized thc X. W. Mountctl Police, 
and nas  succeeded a t  Kingston by Lientenant Irnin,  R.A., now Lieutemnt-Colonel in 
the Canadian Militia. 
3 The Royal Artillery Sergeant Assistant Gunncry Instructors were not sent out until 
the folloning spring. Jleanrrliile the fortress liad bccn re-armed during a Camdian 
winter by recruits of three months. Tlic IVnshington Treaty had not been signed, 
but faith in its prorisions seemed perfect. The gum had been dismounted to enable 
tbe Royal Engineers to  rcpnir the platforms, and the troops had been mithdnnn 
before therc \vas time to remount them, but my task nas compamtircly lightened by 
the fact that all tlic artillery stores ucrc left  to my hand in tlic most perfect order 
by Captain 31urray, 1I.A under the directions of Colonel Gibbon, commanding 
~ o p 1  Artillery in British gortli America. 
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TIIE: NILITARY ASPECT OF ChSADh. 7 ti5 
cers, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Xontizambcrt and those a t  Quebec, whose 
zeal, ability, and natural soldierly qunlities rendered pleasant rt twk at 
t i m a  depressing from want of oucoungement in quarters where I 
have perhaps unreasonabl1 looked for it. I haw no doubt that Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel French, my lato colleague, as well ns Lieutenant-ColoneI 
Irwin, would endorse these remarks as far as conccrns Licutennnt- 
Colonel Cotton and the Officers of the sister Gunnery School. 
A reference to the Militis Genoml Orders, dated 20th October, 
1871, will best explain the original and dominant idea in the formation 
of tho schools, namely, to carry out garrison duties by means of 
rccruita from tho Militia, and at the same time to utilize this garrison 
as a p n n e q  school. It soon became evident that a t  lemt one battcry 
of trained soldiers was necessary for garrison duties, with a Std€ to 
instruct recruits from the Militia who should be supernumemy to the 
regular garrison, while of course eight horses mcro not supposed by 
any soldier to be sufficient for “instruction in riding and driving, 
moving 6eld and siego guns, and gcncml purposes.” I haye no doubt 
the originators of the plan fondly’hoped, as I did, that it would be 
de-ieloped; but not a single gunner or horsc has been added to tho 
strength of tho establishment during tho seren ears of its csistence. 
I obtained from Government tho privilege offorage for the prirato 
horses of the Staff and of 05ccrs attending the schools, and by so 
doing, have succeeded in horsing a coup10 of guns and in creating a 
riding establishment. I f  one ma1 not point to success, it is a t  least 
permissible to tell one’s mistakes. Nine was hopeful credulity in 
believing in thc reasonable expansion of tho Gunnery Schools to 
efficiency ; and conseqnent rashness in undertaking the direction and 
command of a garrison, a Gunnery School, and what is practically 8 
Staff College for all arms, with the inadequiltc details laid down in the 
General Order. Tho last annual report of tho Gunnery Schools may 
show some part of tho result of semn years’ labour; and the repo-rt of 
Coloncl Howitt, R.E., the indefatigable Commandant of the hIilitary 
College a t  Kingston, will show tho success of his struggle to carT 
out military instruction rrith D hitherto inndequata Staff.’ 
The commercial depyession of the past fern years has been no doubt 
i n  (I great measurc tho cimsc of delayed devclopment of military 
educational establishments in Canada. 
Si~aall Arm niid Amntrirtition. 
Tho infantry are amcd with tho Snider rifle, an cxccllont and 
serviceable weapon, bcttcr suited to our Canadian Nilitia than tho 
1 !Cl~oso who wish toacquaint themdres thorou-hly with thi3 subjcct, should rcaa 
tho rarious reports by Colonel Stmngc and otters, published by the Canadian 
Govcmrncnt.-ED. 
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7GG TIIE JIILITARY ASPECT OF CASADA. 
JIa&jnj-&nT, of ivhich it i S  to bo rcgrettcd t h t  tho purchasc has 
been commcnccd bF Canada, as tho Gcncinl Commanding is of opinion 
1‘ that  cannot afford to purchase tho quantity in bulk, and to hayo 
‘L volnntcem amcd with two sorts of rifles and two doscriptions of 
1‘ cartriclgcs on a lino from tho Atlantic to tho Pacific, v d d  bo to 
( 6  court disaster i f  they wcre ~dlccl  upon to take tho field.” 
Tllcrc arc onlr 70,000 Snider rifles in  Canadn, diicli. vlicn wo 
deduct 40,000 in tho bands of tho Activo Hilitia, leaves only 30,000 
for Our Rcscmo Militin, which numbcrs G00,OOO men, a portion of 
\\*11om at  least ronld haye to bo called out and trained in cmergcncy. 
~ 1 1 o  amount of ammunition in tho country is only 150 rounds pcr ritlc, 
an amount which I fcar tho Canadian Nilith might possibly fire away 
in ono or tro gcncml actions. 
Tlic Gcncral Commanding points out thc necessity for a further pro- 
vision :- 
I( I cannot, with a prudent ontlook to tho possibility of mrtridgcs 
66 bcing suddenly rcquircd for scrvicc, rccommend tho diminution of 
‘( our supply, nliich, on tho contrary, should ncrcr bc less than 300 
‘6 rounds per riflc. Cartridges hare to bo imported from England, as 
lL I rcgrct to E~J- v o  haw no mannfmtorics in this countrj to produce 
( 6  thcm, and as Snider mrtridges will by and by not bc forthcoming in 
(( tho Rop1 Arsenal, it may lo ncccssnry for us to bcspcak thcm somc 
(( time bcforo n c  can demand our annual supply.” 
Indccd tho mannfacturo of small arm ammunition appcars to me a 
manifest ncccssits, as also that for artillery. To depend on a bas0 4,000 
miles across thc Atlantic in tho event of cmcrgcncy x-ould bo most 
hazardous ; bcsidcs such n systcm Todd ncccssitato keeping a largo 
stock on hnd,  which, .with so pcrishablo an art& as ammunition, 
would bo umdvisablc, to say nothing of tho constant changcs in war 
matcrinl. Tho Xilitia of Canada without an arsenal to rcly on, not 
only for ammunition, bnt for tho manufacture and rcpnir of gun- 
carriages, harness, camp equipngc, without transport, commismrjat, or 
ambulanccs, &c., would not bo in an cnvirrblc position. Tho subject 
has bccn vcll trcatcd in  tlic Domipion Artillcry Association Prizo 
Essap for 1878, by Colonel Xontizambcrt and Captain ProvoEt, of 
tho Canadian Artillcry. 
Tho essny of the formcr has h c n  printcd in tho Proccedin s of this 
to it (Vol. XXII, KO, XCIV). I shall not therefore cnlargo on tho 
subject, but simply rcmark that Hnlifas, Qucbcc, Kingston, and 
Ottawa are suitable localities for tho establishrncnt of arsenals md 
itep6ts for supply. Tho first tlirec arc fortified, and contain suitcrblo 
government buildings and lands, while tho latter is far removed from 
tho frontier. Both Toronto and Jlontrcal, though ccntrcs of indnstry, 
arc cxposcd, and havc bccn captured in prcvious invasions by tho 
Americans. Tho d o  of labour is quito as cheap and probabIy more 
rcliablc as regards strikes than it nppcars to be in England, tvhilo tho 
raw matcrials, iron, wood, leather, kc., nro abundant, and of tho bcst 
quality. Coals mo not, of coursc, as clicap as in grmt English manu- 
facturing contrcs, but tho watcr powcr is unrivallcd, and wood fuel 
Institution, and thoso wishing for’dctails cannot do better t f an rcfsr 
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THE 3IILITARY LW'ECT OF CANADA. 7G7 
(mhicli is so abundant), when used 3s charconl in the production of 
the finest ironwork, produces the most rcliablc kinds, frcc from tho 
sulphur and phosphorus which it is so difficult to climinsto from 
coal-workcd iron. That produced a t  tllc Londonderry Stecl Com- 
pany of Canada, as rcportcd on by JIcssrs. Gilbcrt and Son, Nontrcal, 
" is said to  liarc a tcnsilc strcngth of G5,000 lbs. pcr squaro inch, 
'' bcing more than 23 per ccnt. grcntcr than that of tllc Ridsdnlc iron 
" used for gun t u h s  in Britain. . . . . Tllis iron in Jvorking 
" also shon;cd rcmarkablc properties of \r-clding." This subject of 
manufacture of irar materials in Canada is of the greatest im- 
portance to the Empire, as rcndcring US self-reliant a t  a timc mhcn 
such self-rclinncc would be essential to the successful rcsistnncc of 
attack. 
That most vital question, an  orgnnizcd sjstcm for  thc supply of 
infantry ammunition in the field, does not seem to have been con- 
sidered. 
Artillcry Ariiminmif. 
It is not necessary for mc to dcscribc the mapificcnt armament of 
thc IIalifas forts, nor to detail the armament of some 400 smooth-bore 
guns, scattcred orer the Dominion, but of little usc in modern war, 
except against boat attack. I can bcst, perhaps, rcndcr scrvicc by 
pointing out the importance of conrcrting this obsolctc armamciit into 
serviceable rifled guns, in accordance with tho requircmcnts of modern 
xar. Tho task is neither so diflicult nor crpcnsivo as may bc 
imagined. 
In addition to tlic riffed guns already dctailccl as mounted, in Van- 
courer Island, and the harbour of St. John's, NCW Brunseck, thcrc 
are at Quebec, cight 7-inch Armstrong brecch-loading rifled guns. 
They have hithcrto been considcred rcry mcnk guns, but by the use 
of an  improved gas check, and by the conrcrsion of thc gun into a sidc 
brccch-loader by turning the trunnions, as has been done lately a t  
Woolmich, the gnn may bo mndc to tnkc n Jarge c h a r p  of tho mild 
pebble powdcr, which i d 1  incrcasc tho power of thc gun while it 
diminishes the initial strain on the brccch. Thcrc arc also two of tlic 
samc 7-inch B.L.R. at Kingston. It was found that in estrcmc frost, 
the brecch-closing apparatus T T ~ S  difficult to  opcn, but by resorting to 
a rcry simple cxpcdicnt, I h a w  orcrcomc this difficulty, and the guns 
might bc considered fairly cfficicnt, cspccially from thcir dominant 
position at Quebec, where thcy command tlic comparatircl-j unarmonred 
deck of an ironclad, which in approaching end-on, 1~0ulc1 present a 
most farourablc parallelogram to artillery fire. 
I n  addition to the Armstrong brecch-loaders arc ten 39-G4-poundcr 
PaIIiser, and t x o  powerful guns presented b~ Sir William Palliser, 
an 8-inch and n 7-inch, converted on his principle. I find from an 
old newspaper extract, that  '' these guns cost Sir William 7001. sterling. 
"Ho had to buy them from Her Najesty's Gorcrnmcnt, and pay 
" Sir W. Armstrong for  their conversion. The freight cnmc to 
I' GOZ. 10s. G d .  He has already ordcrcd a third pn, giwm by tlic 
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768 THE SlEJT'ATrt' ASPECT OF C.iKADiL 
(' Dominion Govcrnmcnt for conrersion a t  Montreal, for which Sir 
'' William pays the cost, and a fourth 10-inch gun (which will pro. 
1' Gably cost moro than thc thrco others put together he has ordered 
$6 further offcrs to convert a11 hcr old guns without profit, commission, 
(1 or royalty, to nhich hc hns a legal right by his patent. Why this 
'( liberality ? Why this affection for old Qnebec ? Must wc hlievo 
"iioblesse oblige? There nro patents of nobility mom noblo than 
(It was during tho period that war wns imminent with Russia),and tho 
Quebec Chronicle goes on to rcmrtrk : '' Thc gift of Sir William Pnlliscr 
4' is indeed B timely ono; unlikc anything in this age, it reads liko (I 
'6 bit of old Elizabethnn story, when English gentlemen from Deron 
" fjtted out wniships ' n t  their own charges' to meet tho great Spanish 
'( Armada." 
Xy first re- after landing in h a &  seven ears ago, was to 
gnns; on tlm Palliser principle, utilizing thercbr thc old mmhges, 
sidearms, and genenl stores, and even the projectiles, tho calibre 
remaining the same. Such nu armament would bo pre-eminently 
snitablo to Canada, thc dcfencc of vhich will main17 depend on 
Canadian Plevnas. I ham therefore continued to reitcmto the sugges- 
tion in  idiich I bmo bwn supportcd by the Xajor-Gencml Command- 
i n g  sincc his arrival in Canada. In dwelling upon the economy of 
converting old smooth-boro guns into new rifles, I do not forget tho 
fact that we rguiro a fcrr powcrful first-class nrmonr-plate piercing 
guns at St. John, Hew Drunsn-ick, Quebcc, and Vnncouver's Island. 
Except nt Halifax, where thcro is an Imperial garrison, TTC h a m  not 
owe such gun in tho Dominion o€ Canada. Ny last report is as 
foli0ms:- 
" But as regards futuro nmamcnt, I would again solicit atttcntion 
I' to tho adrisability of 'adopting tho Pnlliscr systom for converting 
I' in this country tho 400 old smooth-boro guns into rifles, as n1rcad-y 
(6 recommendcd by tbo Genernl' Officer in command, pngo xix of last 
I* Fear's report, sincc which the remarkablc poivcr dcveloped by tho 
lCchambered 7-inch Palliscr gun converted in England i3ndcr it o 
I' suitablc armour-phto piercing gun for coast defences, though for 
land fronts nud cntrenchcd positions along our cstcndcd frontier, I 
I' feel certain no better or cheaper plan could be adopted than tho 
gndual conrersion of onr smooth-borcs into !IO-ponnder, GCpoundcr, 
'* and 40-pounder rifles a t  tho trifling cost of about 1201. per gun, nhilo 
I' tho old wood and iron carriages, platforms, &c., could bc utilized, 
Is nnd ncm wooden carringcs ~ I ~ T C  been mado in this country a t  n less 
" cost than that of importation. 
" Tbo rclatirc cost of constructing wooden carriages and trarersing 
I' platforms a t  Qactec and importing iron or r d e n  onos is shorn 
I' In tho folloTing cstimato :- 
' 4  to bo mado in England, as R gift to  tlic Dominion b orcrnmcnt. Ho 
(4 inherited titles, but Sir William has R claim to both. . . . . . y t  
recommend the conversion of our useless old smoot F -bores into rificd 
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It &ll bo eccn from the Woolwieh Vwbukq of Stores 
that a mought-iron double plito sliding mrriage and 
platform will cost, with freight, kc., added, in round 
numbers, about.. .............................. 
Tho same of wood.. .............................. 
do. mado in Quebec, as proposed.. ..... 
Wrought-iron carriano for Gi-3% poundcrs about.. .... 
Wood carriage bulltqn Quebm.. ................... 
do. for Gi-32-poundem, imported, about.. . 
s eta , $ cts. 
I I 
rr  The manufacture of such material would not only bo nsnring of expenditure, but 
8c would be n benefit to tlic countq by emplo+g our onn artificers and espcn&ng 
(' tho money in the Dominion," 
It must be borno in mind that the Dominion Parliament will mncli 
more readily rote money to  be expcndcd ht fhe country than send out 
of it for tho purchase of mar matctcrial. 
" I beg to recommend strongly tho rcport of Nessrs. Gilbert and Co., 
" Canada Enginc Works, t o  farourable consideration ; trusting that if 
u I a n  rcport satisfactorily on tho proof of tho gun now nearly com- 
'( pleted a t  hlontrcal the Government will not hesitate to ordcr tho 
" p d u a l  convcrsion of thc 400 smooth-borc guns now comparatively 
" useless on our fortifications, and that a sum of moner will be placed 
J' on tho estimates to meet this expenditure as well as that for seven- 
'( teen 7-inch Palliser rifles in licu of seventeen 64-3%pomdcrs prc- 
" vionsly ordered from lVoolwich by tho Dominion Gorornment. 
'( The differences of cost betacen the home manufacture and impor- 
(' tation speak for thcmselrcs. The efficicncy nf Canadian mnnufac- 
" tnrc will, I beliew, be establi.hcd b~ the proof of the gun now 
'' bcing constructed, ns d l  ns infcrcntially from thc fact of the succcss 
'' in tho United States of tho Palliscr principle of conrersion and con- 
(' struction. 1 would, homevcr, for the futuro manufacture in cower- 
" sion of G4-32-pounders recommend that the A-tube be prolonged 
"about 2 fcot G inches beyond the muzzle of tho cast-iron gun, 
" which rrould allow of sufficient length for the use of pcbblc powder, 
'( which, being slowcr burning and exercising less strain on tho gun, 
"- jet  ghes o higher initial rclocity than tho potidre Zrufalc for 
'( which tlic short Woolwich guns were originally constructed. With 
'( the addition of. the chamber I believe the 64-32-pounders could Lo 
" msdo to penetrate considerably more than 5 inches of iron, ns it 
'( has already done. The cost of this change mould be inappreciable,. 
" and the practical inconveniencc of increased length ?d, as the prc- 
&' pondernnco already esisting would allow of an iucrcnsc of 4 feet 
FOL. SXIII. 3 F  
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770 T m  MILITARY ASPECT OF CAXADA. 
$ 6  of &tube if rcquird for ballistic purposcs. I bclierc it would also 
ndPisabIc in lion of studs to ndopt the cspanding base-ring 
'6 system so successfully esperimentcd upon a t  Shoeburpcss, and 
4' nlrendy introduced in the Unitcd Stntes as inrcntcd by Captain 
6' Butler, U.S.A. It will bo secn that a system of gradtiat conversion 
66 will enable us (at a minimum of coat and mssimum of cfficioncy) to 
66 avail ourselws of t$ scicntific cxperiments arr icd on at Shocburj- 
'6 ness and clscmhere. 
JVIien it is rememborcd that science has to wait upon licr handmaid, 
mcchnnicnl skill, the comparatircly circuitous p t  progressive march 
of modcrn artillery is not surprising. The earliest guns were of grcat 
length to allow of tho consumption of tho wcakdow-burning powder. 
Thcy were coniposite breech-loaders of coiled wrought iron. When 
tho p o d e r  was improved, the brccch-closing apparntus in tho in- 
fancy of mechanical skill could not be made strong enougli, and had 
to bc abandoned for muzzIc-loading, the cumbrous lcngth was got 
rid of. Then the powder, being M) improved as to acquire the title o€ 
poicdre bmtale, had to be modified sons to reduce thc strain of enormous 
chrps on monster guns, which will again have to be leugthcned and 
chambered and probably breech-loaded. It is not m-ithin tho sco o 
of this paper to discuss tho claims of various systcms, and oertainf$ 
not hastily to condemn our own, which (in spite of tho impctuous 
attacks made upon it sinco the accidental burst of a single gun) has 
stood the test of time, and will no doubt bo further modified to 
snit modern requiremcnts. Under tho circumstnnces, however, I 
must respcctfully admit that I do not regret that thc advice, I pre- 
6ume given by tho Colonial Defence Committee, to purchase short 
Woolwich guns, has not been followcd by tho Dominion of Canada. 
Ncmtimo tho batteries of garrison artillery organized at tho im- 
portant points mnrkcd on thc map should bo employed in constructing 
batteries reveted with tho iron-band gabions so easily constructed 
from the hooping of bales of goods. Such revetments would last half 
a century with but f e n  repairs, and if nrmcd with 64-38 Palliscr 
conrertcd guns to prevent close attaek, and cover torpcdoes, wodd 
render secure the harbours of our long lake frontier, as wcll fls other im- 
portant points, rhicli the economic application of tho Jfoncrieff prinoiplo 
would render very formidable. The requirements of a country like 
Canada nnd the peculiar aptitudcs of its people reqnire that European 
military organizations should be modified to snit them. 
Tho Jlilitia gnrrison artillery nnd engineer corps should bc amalga- 
mated to form an universal pioneer corps to work guns of position or 
garrison, as well as to construct and arm the batteries they fight, which 
would most probablF bo nised in conjunction with torpedo systems. 
Tho other rough pioneer work of bridging, kc., would ccme most 
naturally to the intelligent Canadian mechnnics who chieily compose 
the corps of garrison artillcry and engineers. Tho latter corps arc 
very fcw in number, and in isolated positions. 
In conclusion, it must bo borne in mind that Canada norcr bas 
been and never can bo dependent on British bayonets. The history of 
her struggles against innuion shon.ed that she could and did, with 
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T I E  hLtLITARY ASPEOT OF CXVADA. 771 
the nssistancc of but few British troops, bcar tho brunt of it With hcr 
militia, who almost unaided rolled back .tho tido of war from hcr 
shores. Before tho conclusion of the Trcaty of Peace in 1814-15, not 
a sin& hmcrican sentry or post remained on Canadian shore, while 
wo wero in possession of Port 3Inckillimacinack and other points in 
what is now the Stnto of Michigan. 
Port p.-oASADIM' C0STlSGEh.T FOE IMPEBIAL SERVICE AND BIILITARY 
COLOSIZITIOX. 
" When danger of war, real or imaginary, threatens tho Empire, the 
'' first thonght is what rr broad mark tho circle of British Colonies 
" offers to an enemy: the second, by what a might1 circle of for+ 
" rcsses and outworks the centro of British power is dcfondcd. T L  
" sccond thought is the sounder. BIerely to estcnd territorial posses- 
" sions is to g v o  SO many morc hostages to fortnno in war. The more 
'' thc BritishEmpirc is of his character the wealicr its lino of dcfence. 
" But expansions of t e n  torial dominion which havo widened the 
" limits within which the Anglo-Saxon race can spread and multiply, 
" add to the vitality of t t c  Empiro. The British Empire is self- 
" sufficient if its resources can be brought into justaposition 60 as to 
supplement cclch other."' 
The offer of a C'madian contingent suggested wry forcibly the 
capnbilities England possesses for military purposcs in its Colonies, 
and what wry little use has hitherto been madc of them. 
'( Wcro it possible to imagine Gcrmauy, Austria, or Bussia possessed 
" of Colonial dominion like ours, me may be sure tho first thought to 
'' occur to tho rulcrs of any of theso Empires nonld be tho contingent 
'( a c h  dependcnc could bo made to contribato to tho army." But  
hry contribution of men from tho colonies, Sot what could not be 
demanded was volunteered ! 
'' The staunch and rcmarkablc loyalty of Canada to tho British Crown 
6' has not perhaps cvoop been more signi6cautly manifested than during 
'' the cnrly part of tho past and prerions year, whon offers of service 
'' in the event of mar Were preferred to tho extent of raising in Canada 
" scrcml thousand men to scrvo with tho British Army. These offcrs, 
(' some of pcrsoml service, others to miso battalions, bore tho stamp of 
(' I thorough determination to givo willing and material reinforce- 
'' mont to Hor Ithjcsty's troop. T h y  wero the spontaneous ex- 
'' pressions of a loynl and a high-spirited people to throw in thoir lot, 
" as a r e g  important factor, in  the destinies of Great I3ritain. Thcse 
" offers mero as cordidl~receircd b the Imperial Gomxmnent as they 
'' bat that the hardy and stalwart sons of Canda nonld ham been 
Erom B leaclin,o article in tho Times, Unrch Sth, 1879. 
3 ~ 2  
though England l rn neither the power nor tho desiro to enact a mill  
'' were loyally made, and should t l c occasion have arisen, no doubt 
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7 72 T I E  JIlLITARY ASPECT OF OANADA. 
‘‘ found standing manfully shouldcr to shouldcr with tlicir nativc-born 
“ brcthrcn of tlint ‘ old country ’ viliich thcy love so well.”1 
Lot us hopc that in quictcr times thc gencrous offer mill not be 
forgotten on either side. 
A peacc military sptcm that docs not admit of ready expansion to 
meet thc emergency of war without dislocation is not worth the 
moncy spcnt on it. 
Of tho 12 military districts into which Canada is divided, 11 and 12 
(Xanitoba, and British Columbia) nre still compratively nnpcoplcd 
territories, and nccd not bc considcrcd in tho prcscnt plan. It mas 
proposed that thc Canadian mar contingent, 10,000 strong, should 
number two brigades of 5,000 strong, a brigadc of thrcc ficld bat- 
teries, an artillcry pionccr corps, combining thodutics of s i c p  or posi- 
tion artillery with thoso of pionccrs wtificcrs, and a rcgimcnt of 
Thc nucleus and rccmiting depat of this forcc in  pmcc time to con- 
sist of two small battalions of 500 men each, each company 100 strong 
named, numbered after, and rccruitcd for and afilintcd with thc head- 
qFirtcrs of cach of tho 10 military districts. Commnndig Officcrs of 
Nilitia Corps forwarding to tho Deputy Adjutnnt-Gcncral of cach 
military district tlic names of Officers and mcn wishing to servo in 
tho contingent, Officers of tho School of Gunncry, and Military College 
Cadets bcing given a prcfcrcncc. Thc Militia Uedical O5cer of tllc 
district stnff could csnmino rccrnits to prevent ineligible men bcing 
forwarded to battalion head-quarters. Thc two dcpat battalions could 
bc further divided into wings if  neccssary, and quartered at St. John, 
n . 0 ~  Brauswick, and Quebec, with detachmcnt on St. Hclcn’s, Uon- 
trcal, and Fort Islc-aus-Nois, 
Tho othcr battalion divided bctvccn Kingston and Toronto, mitli n, 
company doing duty as a guard for the Governor-Gencral, furnishing 
ordcrlies at head-quarters, &c. Them is barrack accommodation at 
all thc abovc places except head-qnnrters, and tho barracks a t  St. 
Hclcn’s and St. John’s, both burnt, Fould havo to bc rebuilt. 
The artillcry organization word$ only rcquirc tho prcscnt gunnery 
schools a t  Kingston and Qucbcc to havo the horses increased to a 
completc field battery for cach, and an artillcry artificer or engineel* 
company added for thc repair of fortifications, war material, &c. 
The mvalry might bc rcprescntcd by n, troop at Toronto, znd on0 a t  
Qocbec, there being a riding school at both.placcs. 
The rrborc would amply provido for gcmison duties, maintaining 
internal ordcr, and the instruction of the Niliticl, rhilc therc could bo 
cspanded into an Axmy Division for Far seroicc on their o\vn frontiers, 
in Enropc or Asia, or such proportions of thcm, one, two or thrco 
battalions as might bc wished for, such scrvicc battalions being paid 
by Great Britain when serving out of Canada; the &pat battdlOAS 
alwap to rcmain and recruit in Canada, invalids and time-espired 
mcn being rcturned to their originnl companics for discharge. 
I helicvc tho aborc is tho only feasible organization for an Imperial 
contingent. Tho offers of service made by ccrtainxlit ia corps eic 
ff cnenl Sir Sclby Sm~th’8 Report. 
carnally 
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TLIE JIILZTARY ASPECT OF CASAD-L 773 
bloc, though well meant, mcrc quito incapablc of fulfilmcnt without 
dislocating thc agriculture and commcrco of tllc country as well as its 
home dcfencc. 
It is to bo liopcd tho mistake mado in mising tho 100th Canadians 
will novcr again bc rcpeatcd. They arc probably a scrviccablc corps, 
but having no recruiting dcpdt in Canada thcy bavo long ceased to 
linvc anything Canadian about thcm bcyond tho maplo lcaf badgc thcy 
h a ~ o  carricd to scrrc in our Indian Empire. Thcro S C C ~ S  to be a 
madness among D certain class for ignoring thc sentiment of soldicrs. 
Disciplina and esprit suffer mhcn soldicrs aro madc to bear a ladgo 
and titlc to which thcir hearts do not respond. 
Thcrc mould bc a difficulty about tho ratcs of pay for an Imperial 
contingcnt. Thc prcscnt Canadian ratcs of pay of Officers arc higher 
than thoso of the British Army, and howcvcr willing, thcro arc not a 
numerous class in Canada who mould bc able to serve tho Empirc cvcn 
partially at thcir own cxpcnsc. 
ilfilitary Jolciiizatioit in Caitnda. 
I n  considcring tho question of a Canadian contingcnt for Imperial 
scrFicc, it would bo manifcstly unjust and impolitic to allow many of 
the young men of a young country to bc nbsorbcd by military scrvico 
in  Europc, without making provision for thcir final return and scttle- 
mcnt in Canada. To tho young men themselves and thcir relatives it 
mould be cqually cruel m d  unjust to pay thcm off in London or else- 
where, at thc conclusion of thcir scrvicc, with a fcm pounds in  thcir 
pockets, perhaps to bccome waifs and strajs of thc grcat floating dc- 
moralized population of some great city. Undoubtcdly emigration is 
onc of the grcat questions of thc day, which will not bo answered by 
‘‘ drift ;” 40,000,000 on a comparatively small island, ~ t h  inadcquato 
food supply, and failing manufactures, on thc othcr side of a tcn dajs’ 
sail, 4,000,000 scattcrcd along a riband of 4,000 milcs, Le., tho popula- 
tion of ono city, London, occupying or mtlicrstrngghg with thc culti- 
vation and dcvclopment of a territory as lnrgc as Europe, with au 
amblc nrca equal to that of Europe without Russia. 
Nannfacturing magnates may for manifest rcasons discourage cmi- 
@:tion, ncglcct our colonics, kecp homo population a t  starvation 
point, until thcy harc bcen mot by strikes that pamlyso industry, and 
threaten to transferour trado to  foreign countries. Then instead of tho 
peoplc being encoumgcd to emigrate, t11c-j arc taught to clamour for 
thosc q m r i a n  laws that n 4 l  sooner or  later shake Great Britain, as they 
shook Rome, to hcr wry foundation, unlcss the cmigmtion question is 
systcmatically considered and cncouragcd. Wc hnvo bccn willing to 
strugglc for black cmpirc as long as it required cotton clothing, but as 
soon as it threatens to cover its nakcdncss without JIanchestcr help, 
mc say perish Indin! or Africa, 01% anymherc clso that won’t clothc 
itself with our cotton, and yct mc ignore tlic manifest means of pro- 
tecting ourselves b j  a commcrcid Zollvcrcin with our colonies. Surcly 
British mcrchnnts don’t necd to bc taught by British soldicrs that 
commcrcc mcans empirc, and cicc cersci. Thc German Enipirc i ~ n s  
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774 TIIE MILITARY ASPECT OF U.LVAD-L 
consolidated 1)s commerce, not cannon. The treaty of the Zollvcrein, 
in 1831, pared tho way for that reunion of the German Principnlitics 
consummated at  Sedan, yet wc seem indifferent to the commercial 
dcvclopmcnt of an Anglo-Saxon Empire and its commercial relations 
wit11 ourselves, which are surely capable of adjustment to tho mutual 
advantage of ours$vcs and our colonies. Canada has already led 
tllo "ray by proposing differential duties against tho Unitcd States, 
manifestly in  farour of Great Britain, whoso press, misunderstanding 
tho points a t  issnc, has met her with expressed displeasure, instead of 
encouragement. 
True there is room for uneasiness as to how far tho trado self-pro- 
tection of Australia and Canada, as opposed to protection of tho 
general Imperial intcrcsts, may bc carried, but tho game is yet in our 
o m  hands. Commercial union with our colonies is surely possible, 
anlcss we declinc to discuss tho matter e t l i  thcm, and prefer tho 
system of " drift." Let us remember that though wo drifted into 
cmpirc in tho east, we drifted out of it in tho west, when a question 
of tariffs in 1776 lost us the Amcricau colonies, and a hundred years 
later those colonies mcrc still suffering from the internecine strife that 
a p i n  rosc out of ib question of tariffs, though thc slavery question was 
thc stalking horsc selected. 
It is a 
magnificent field for the cultivation of military and administrativo 
talent among intollcctually selected specimens of our upper classes. 
The birthright of the British yeoman, tho broad Iands of our colonies, 
vierc of necessity ceded with rcsponsible gowrnment to the Colonial 
Lcgislatures. The Crown lands no longcr belong to tho Cromn of 
Great Britain, and this is tho main impediment to any extensiro 
system of organized military emigration. Yet as it is manifestly to 
the advantnge of the colonies that there should bo an orpnizcd system 
of emigration, instead of leaving thcm to tho unhappy:go-unlucky 
want of sjstem by which stowamiys and criminals, effemmate clerks, 
sud gentlemon whose heads am sometimes as soft as their hands, may 
drift to their shores. 
Hitherto tho military emigration of British OBicers and soldiers has 
failed because it was based on wrong principles, and that lntelysttemptcd 
by Canada herself in  giving grants of land to the time-expired soldiers 
of the battalions sent for service to Fort Garry has benefited nobody 
but land speculators, because it mas based upon broad republican prin- 
ciples, which do not snit soldicrs or men habituated to discipline. An 
indiscriminate grnut or land order for 160 acres was given to Officers 
and men alike. The grant hada  namo, but no local habitation; its 
whereabouts was not defincd; to the mind of tho supposed settler it 
might turn out a shaking swamp (muskcg), a strip of alkaline desert, 
or an uncleared wilderness of valueless wood. No Officer of S C ~ S O  or 
self-respect would think of settling d o r n  on an equality with Privato 
Tommy Athins and isIrs. T., to w11oso husband ho had so lately ad- 
ministered pack-drill. * Unscrupulous Officers ivere tempted to buy tho 
prospective claims of their men for tho price of ib few bottles of old 
~e whisky, not to becomo Zoizd fi7e settlers, but to hold, and snbse- 
India can never bo the homo of tho Anglo-Saxon yeoman. 
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THE JIrLITARY ASPECT OF CANADA. 775 
qucntly to scll, to land speculators. I am spcaking with a knowledge 
of facts. 
Again, the old colonization by Imperial troops W'&R bawd on tlie 
idca that every soldicr, aftcr pcrhaps 21 years' hard ,gcrvicc, mainly 
in tropical climates, was fit, in comparatively old age, to blossom iiito 
D succcssful colonial farmer, no inattcr what Iiis antcccdcnts-being 
without capital, energy, or agricultural cxpcricnco. The first or 
second semi-Arctic winter of Canada drove him to despair and drink, 
to which military service in old times only too frequently prcdisooscd 
a man. A s  for tho Officers, not having been in  the first instance 
granted estates commensurate with their rank, and having spent most 
of thcir capital or retired pay in tho purchuc of land, they sank to 
tho lcrcl of tho rank and filc, and their sons, oftcn without propcr 
education, intermarricd with the daughters of tlie ordinal-y working 
population, or in some cases of their fathers' servants, who crentnnllg 
on-ned tho farm on which they bad k c n  hirccl to work. Canada is 
strewn with the wrecks of the families of British Officers. Of conrse 
thcrc aro cxccptions to cvery rule. One of tho most striking is that 
of the dcscendnnts of thc 79th Highlanders, Officers and men, dis- 
banded after the war in 17G0, settlcd a t  Murray Bay, near Quebcc, 
15 years afterwards. They left tlieir farms to march against the 
Americans invading Canada, and returned to thcir plouglfiharcs wlicn 
they shcathcd their victorious claymores. 
Tlie settlcmcnt of the 79th Higlilandcrs was upon tho old French 
fcndal systcm. Thc Colonel and OEccrs were gircn scignoria1gmnt.s 
of land and magisterial privilcges, and their dcsccndants arc still to 
be found lop1  to the Crown, and curionsly enough the s ignorid 
estatcs ham devolved upon anothcr Officcr of the 79th, nearly a 
century aftcr the original settlement, by right of his wife, the 
danghter of the last seigneur. The seignorial privileges have been 
abolished. 
The original scttlcrs mere not supplied with Scotch wives, and the 
amiable little French Canadian girls with whom t h y  intermarried 
made them good Catholics and happy fathers of a numerous progeny, 
still retaining thc typical frame and vigonr of the Scot though spzak- 
ing in the softcr tongue of France. 
Emigration to the old provinco of Quebcc is no longer rcquircd. 
The l?rench Canadians have iucrccrsed so rapidly as to have alrcsdy 
omigrated in considerable numbsrs to tho United Stdcs.. And tllQ 
fertile province of Ontario has also got far beyond the need of military 
emigration, but it is rcquired to open up mhnt mill h the great graiu- 
producing valler of tho Saskatchcwm with its coal-fields-& fertile belt 
of alluvial pnirio soil with an acreage about equd to that of Spain, 
Frame, and England put together. Here such pioneers would be 
mantcd in tho first instance to build tho Pacific railroad, guard tho 
depdts of supplies, &c., form settlements along tho route, and givo 
military security against Indians a t  a cost that could scarccly, by any 
possibility, reach what Cauada already p y a  for her mounted military 
police, 1,000 dollars per man per nnnum. Far less would be the cost 
of the passage of military settlers and thcir families with a supply 
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of thrcc Scars’ rations and agricultural implements, whilc the covcrcd 
carts tllat con-ie-pd them to their location on thcir prairie home would 
giro slicltcr until quarters wcre constructed. British Columbia, csp~. 
cially along its soutlicrn fronticr and in Vancouvcr’s Island, requires 
such military scttlemcnts for manifest reasons it is not necessary to 
discuss. The climate is morc farourablc to our race than that of any 
colony, except perhaps that of New Zealand and that of Tasmania; it 
rescmblcs England without thc east wind. Thc same physical causes that 
harc contributcd to England’s greatness will, to a, certain estcnt, creato 
in  Vancouver’s Islaud, in  no w r y  rcmote future, a prospcrous countv. 
Thc cqunblc temperature produced by tho equatorial current, corre- 
sponding in  the Pacific to the Atlantic Gulf Stream, brings down tho 
isothermal lines far south of thc corrcsponding latitudcs on tho castcrn 
coast, creating a, climate that gives a maximumof working days in tho 
year as against climates of estremes. Vancourer’s Island and British 
Columbia is as large as France and Ireland, but tho amble arc5 is 
contracted by the mountain ranges ; thero are, howercr, vast tracts of 
brush-gmss suitable for herds that require no honsc wintering. The 
coal, iron, and gold, and splendid timbcr not far from n serics of 
magnificent harbours, will make Vancouver R trade-starting point from 
America forkin-as England has been from Europe to America. If 
there is any truth in  Buckle’s “History of Civilization,” Western 
Britain will be great when the Californian, recciring no fresh blood 
from Europe, has degenerated into tho sans soztciaiacc of the southern 
Enropean. 
This is the country that asks for secession for want of railway 
arterial connection with Canada. It is too far for onr population to 
rcach it by the ordinary system of “drift.” 
The short-service system of our Army will supply a young, vigorous, 
and intelligent class of emigrants, who ham bcen long enough in the 
Army to lcarn habits of order and obcdicncc without bcing so long 
as to acquire a dislike for hard labour, or the intempemto habits 
too often the result of monotonous and protracted service in a t opiml 
climate. To lead your short-servicc hmyrcserrcs, and settlc them when, 
they are most wanted, on thc exposed frontiers of tho Empirc, as the 
Roman legions were planted mith their Officers to hold the line of thc 
Danube, and become in long aqes the Roumanian peoples, yon soon will 
have by the Compulsory Rctircment Warrant a plcthom of young 
energetic Officers condemned prematarely to linger grumblingly on 
tho steps of ‘( thc crutch and toothpick.” You may find nrnong them, 
thou@ now “ mntc and inglorious,” somc Raleigh or hlilcs Stnndish, 
and (if less visionary and fanatic than Elizabethan or Puritan heroes) 
crowds of such self-reliant caraliers as planted thc Old Dominion 
that you lost through “ drift.” Let your young, though timc-cspircd 
soldieis, go and build you up R new Dominion on thc Pacific slopes. 
Thc lands mkich no longcr belong to thc Crown may bc rcgaincd 
by thc pnrchasc of Rharcs in thc Canadian Pacific Railroad, in ac- 
cordancc with the original plan proposed by Sir John A. llacdonald, 
Prcmicr of Canada, viz., to build thc linc by the sale of land of 
no value to Canada until settled, allotting a strip of territory along 
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tho proposed Pacific Railroad routo as a portion of tho shares and 
sccurity of thosc who ndvanccd capital to build tho linc. Other rail- 
way schcmcs, notably tlic Grand Trunk, harc bcen tho ruin of many, 
bccauso almost all tho shares vcrc in tho hands of holders living in 
England. Sco that tho Canadians tako a fair sharo of this responsi- 
bility, which thcy are quito rcady to do, sccing t h y  haro attcmptcd 
to build thc road alono without help bcyond an Impcrial guarnntco to 
thcir loan of 3,000,000L Railway stock may sink, an Egjytian 
Klicdirc may repudiatc, but soil along a railway in a suitablo climate 
cannot rcmain valucless, and is a material guarmtcc against loss. To 
cnablc tho Imperial Government to carry out an organized schcmc of 
military colonization, it will bo necessary for her to purcliasc stock 
(which n-ill carry with it land) in tho Canadian Pacific Raillmy. It is 
a truer, safer routo to India through her o m  tcrritory than that sho 
purchased by her shares in the Sucz Canal. Canads should of courso 
start o similar gs tcm by sclccting military colonists from the Officers 
and men of hcr permanently cmbodied Militia and Contingent for 
Imperial sarvico whcn tho neccssity for such arises. Sho will by this 
means not only develop her territory, and giro it protection, but obtzin 
cfficicnt military scrvice without running into tho bottomlcss cspcndi- 
tnro of Army pensions.’ 
Tho success of any such system mill depcnd cntircly OII selection 
puro and simple of qualified Officcrs, who must bo let alono in their 
sub-sclcction. Any attempt at devclopmcnt of tho “ poor dcvil, giro 
“ him a berth, system,” can’t possibly succeed, when men haro to  
contend against naturc, which must bo fought with her own weapons, 
“ selection of tho fittest.” 
The selectcd thrco years’ time-espircd good conduct nou-commis- 
sioned officer or soldier from tho British h y  or Canadiar rcgular 
troops, shonld sign au agreement to scrro five ycars, tho first two in 
one of tho Cauadian depdts of regular troops, but bo liablo to dismissal 
for misconduct or laziness. Ho mould learn tho country, and tho dcpat 
Officers would lcarn his character and ability. A t  tho crpiration of 
the first two ycars of probation, ho would bo sent on to a military 
farm on tho Pacific Railway or frontier of British Columbia, whcro he 
would bo cmployed in constructing tho milway and learning practical 
ngriculturo on tho Government farms undcr ORiccrs and’non-commis- 
sioncd officcrs who had Icarned tho work by similar provious training. 
Should he still haro conducted himself well, and ahown that. hc rrould 
bo liliely to succccd on a.farm, hc mould bc givcn onc in a series of 
villages. His houso ho would previously havo assisted to build with 
his comrades whilo working as a military labourer; during his fire 
years’ pcriod hc would bc receiving rations and pay; but after bcing 
started on a farm with II liouso, implements, and rations till thc first 
harvest mas rcapcd, he should requirc no more assistance, but bo 
still liablo to frontier militarx or policc serricc, and military disci- 
plinc under his chicfs. It would bo necessary to continuo pay to 
Tho British capitalist will scrro Iiimsclf and his countrF bcttcr bs  inrcsting in 
such a mihvay and colonization scliemc, than by lcnding hi3 nioncy to Russia for 
tho construction of strategic niliraj3. 
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77s TIIE IlIILITARY ASPEUT OF CAXADA. 
Oliicers and non-commissioned officers supervising work and main- 
taining discipline for which it ~ o u l d  bo ncccssary to invcst thcm with 
magisterial poirer~. 
Captain J. C. R. C O M ~ ,  R.3c.A.: I wish to crprcss what I fccl sure is tho 
feeling of crerybody who hns listcned to this paper, riz., tho gratitude which i3 duo 
to Colonel Stmngc for coming forward hcrc and giving us such raluablo infonna- 
tion, and which would inrolvc m3t persond labour had'persons to seek for it 
themclrc~. It is only thoso who mad tlicsc papers and studF thesc subjects who 
arc at n11 nwnrc of the depth of rcsenrch required to bring fonrard such a p p c r  as 
that to which wc Iiavc just had tkc pleasum of listening. With read to thc Grst 
point nbout tlic Pacific smboad, Colonel Strnnzc remarks with re?crcncc to Alaska 
that it is t' a slice with which onc eaglc accommodated thc other, pcrhapr with 3 
(' prospect of a futum carcase in that 1omlitF.'' It may bc uscful to state that thero 
is no " pcrhaps" nbout it. In the rcporh of tlic General and the American Com- 
mission that wcm sent to dhska by thc h e r i m  Gorernmcnt preriou, to tho 
amngcmcnt being carried out, tho object shted in that eonfidcntinl report subsc- 
qucntlj published (I belicrc accidentally), that the only mlue of ~ilaslis was that it, 
in a military sense, would bc a position which would mutzlc British ion-er in' tho 
North Pacific, and that with regard tc tiading intcrcsts it would and must bring 
about thc cession of British Columbii to the States. So thcrc is no " pcrhaps " 
nbout it. Colonel Strnngc remarks : " It is hardly to be supposed that tho mistress 
"of the seas and tho eldest hughtcr, Canada, who nlrcady nnks thiid among 
'ctlic mmluercid narks of tho world, would permit the sicgc h i n  destined 
" for the attack on Quebec to bc conreyed by sea." Well, lookinn t o  two facts I 
t b k  it i3 not to bc supposed that wc eren dm3m that such 3 thyng iiiy happen, 
but there ie a great'dcnl of c2iffcrcncc between haring nn opinion and a msh and 
taking practical measures for carving it out. When we talk in this way, that it is 
hard to supposc tlic mistress of thc EBS would not do this and would not do that, 
what I think bchorc3 crerjbody to weigh and considcr is, what preparation is sho 
makin 3 becnusc ivlntcvcr her nish is, her actual power to do what shc wishc3 viU 
dcpcnf upon the preparntion shc makcs, and I do positively dcchre that wc arc I 
think, in grcat danger of assuming too much with regard to that qucstion. At 
crc bo6y Tho assumes thnt it mould hardlr be suppod the mistress of tho EC~IS 
woxd not do so nnd so, earnestly scek out what shc is doing now, That preparation shc 
is making, becaw nlthough IOU may not wish it to bc su posed, it m y  unfortunatcly 
hppen in consequence of your own negligcncc. Things bppeucd that English 
pco le nerer supposed R O U I ~  happen. 
&tli regard to the Pnciac seaboard I wish to offer one or two wry brief rcmarks. 
'Jhro is another roluc, which is the coo1 raluc, that Colonel Strange alluded to, and 
I think the EnglLth pcoplc gcncrnlly are suffering from rc3t ignorance a d  apathy 
with r c w d  to all the30 things which lie outside thcimmegate locnlity in which they 
lire. e i t h  regnrd to thii rcry part of. the seaboard, two years ago I read a paper 
here on our mrnl nnd military 'poition in tho Xortlt Pncific, and I e r e  somo 
particulars of the coal mines at Vancourer's. There ITLU 3 wry intcrcsting book 
published not many months ngo by a well kuorm member of Pnrliiment, Xr. 1Iusjey. 
Vivian, on ti trip to dmcriea, and in that book hc entcrcd h r g e l ~  into questions 
concerning Camd3; but he makes a statement which is absolutely incorrect, nnd it 
is thosc statements thnt midead poplo to o great extent. Iie mys for instanco, 
Xaturc lms onlj proridcd Cnnado mth two eoal-flel&, one in Xom Scotia and the 
other in New Brunsrick; but tho best d - l i c l l  as rewds- quality is on the 
Pacific seaboard of Canada, and this fact hc appeared to boqgnornnt of. That gircs 
another importnncc to tho PnciGo seaboard.. Colonel Stnngc points to tho argu- 
ments that hare taken placc as to whether tho defence of British Columbia or our 
aeiboard on tho Pacific is nu Impcrial qucjtion, and until wc really beliere in this, 
that cwrgthing that il vital to our Empire is an Imperial question, we ~ h d  ~ ~ K I L J S  
bc in a confusion about it. Xow thcrc is 3 wry crtrnordimry result produced by 
tho di@crcncc of opinion as to what t and what is not an Imperhl qucstion. Colonel 
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Strangc has brought thc question bcforc u9 whether it is tlic Dominion of Canadr 
or tlic Empirc of Grcat Britain which should prolido for thc dcfcncc of that 
placc, but if you 10s t h t  point, if yiu IOPC thosc con1 minca, thc parts of tho 
Empirc which will most dircctly su5cr aro &cat Brihin and Australia. If onco 
you IOSC t h t  point you rclcosc tho wholc Pacific seaboard of America ; zou ccxc to 
ham thc power of cliccking the cruizcrs such as ivcrc bought by Russia tlic other 
day, Icaring hcr PaciGc ports. Your flects cannot kccp thc ECR, and Austnlia is 
opcn, and tho road to Autralia is an Impcrid qucstion, thcrcforc thc sccurity of this 
point is ccrtainly an Impcrial qucstion. Wc call an hpc r i a l  qucstion anjthing 
that conccrns tho British pcoplc liring in thc Uuitcd Engdom, and aa long as that 
Ficw continues, so long shall wo haw confusion M to whnt is Impcrial and wllat ie 
not. Takc thc PaciGc Railwa ninc men out of ten in thk country mll tcll you 
that  is a Canadian conccrn-siFnerer will bc able to m d c  it. This is d l  nonscnsc, 
for thc Pacific Railmy is an Impcrial question. How few pco 10 think it is an 
Impcrial question. W e  must rcmembcr thc construction of &at linc  ill bring 
B u s t n h ,  Chinn, and Japan nearcr-w rcg3rds timc-b us. Takinr. tllc sca as ow 
o n  dominion, for it must bc our dominion if wc arc to l i ~ ,  it givc<us thc shortest 
possiblc 1ind:hrough our dominion of thc sea and through tlic British dominion in 
North America. Then you m y  that k a qucstion of moncy, and wc cannot agree 
about it, nnd 60 it drops. Thc tmlc  of Australia ia enormously increasing, and 
anybody who has rad  Payne’s European Colonies will gct a r c ~  intcrcsting 
account tlierc of thc gmdual shifting of cirilization following sea basins. I Ic  tnccs 
thc ancicnt colonics and hc traccs thc shifting from thc JIeditcrmncan basin to the 
Atlantic. Xow cirilization and roamss havc akcady commcnccd to shift from the 
basin of thc Atlantic to that of t i e  Pacific. At this moment what has happcncd 
Kith rcgard to thc Suez Canal is happening Kith regard to tlic milway across 
Amcrica. Tlic effect of cutting thc Suez Canal hn3 bcen wry much morc in favour 
of countrics harin JIc4itcmncan seaboard than it has bccn to us us a commercial 
mntter, and noboc& can watch what has bcen the effect on tho commcrcc in the 
Pacific without obscrring that it is in likc mnnncr being clirertcd toWard3 thc Statcs. 
The only possiblc “ray for u9 to gct it in thc futurc is by thc Candan Fhilway. 
The Br.itish pcoplc now haic tho opportunity of doing what our fathers for ccnturim 
wcrc cndcarouring to do, to End a short northcrn routc to thcothcr sidcof the world. 
Bctwccn lS00 and 1816 RC spent morc than a million upon Arctic Expcclitions, all 
for what? to gct a short routc to thc othcr side of thc world. Wc  harc found it, 
thcrc it is through British Korth Bmcrica, and if complctcd bF a railway it would 
cost somc ten millions ; so KC despisc what BC hare found and our fathers sought. 
Wc should, howcrcr, not only rcgnrd thia railway from thc standpoint of its 
stratcgiul T ~ U C  to Canada, but as ritaUy concerning futurc British power in tho 
PacSc and as thc ]icy to British porrer in thc futurc to command tho E C ~  on the 
othcr side of thc world. 
Colonel FLETCAEE, C.3I.G. : I ~hould not h ~ c  riscn to say anything crccpt to 
supply a slight omission which Colonel Strange’s own modesty hns lcd him to n d o  
in the paper that hc h a  just rcad. Hc alludcd to the exccllcncc of thc Canadian 
Artillcry mthout saying thnt that exccllcnco is in great nica.j’urc duc to thc cscccd- 
ing energy, skill, and tact that ho lina showu in organizinw drilling, and gctting 
ready for scrricc tho batteriw of artillery now in t h t  Do%nion. Through tho 
csertions of Coloncl Strange, Colonel Frcnch, and others, school3 of gunncry hare 
bccn cstnblished, which form n sort of nucleus of a pcrmnncnt forcc. I won’t call it 
Q pcrmanent forcc, but a nucleus of a place of instruction and a typc on which othcr 
bodics of troops can bc formed. It so oftcn hrppcns that the scrviccs of Oficcrs 
who arc away from tlxir corps arc not remembered ; thcrcforc I did not likc to losc 
the opportunity of making allusion from what I saw mjsclf as J W t a  Sccrctary in 
Canada to thc crccllcnt work donc by thc Officers of thc R o p l  yrti l lcg ivhilc 
attached to thc Dominion Forces. 
Sir IIESRY LEFEOT :Pcrliaps I can bcar nthcr  more recent testimony crcn than 
my fricnd Coloxl Flctchcr, for I had tlic good fortuno and plcasurc of being tho 
gucst of Coloncl Stnnnc a t  Qucbcc lcss than two years ago, and of thcrc sccing a 
ficld battcv that mi& h;lrc appcnrcd with credit on Woolwich Common, going 
through its *ill, and of secing tho wholc machinery of tho School of Instruction 
779 
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carricd on, with all tho greater intclligencc nnd zcnl that it was cntircly roluntarJ= 
I n  that rcncrablc pr ison,  which 1 knew 30 years ngo in its palmier days, 1 ~ a w  thc 
spirit of military llfc kept nlirc entirely though tho energy of Colonel Stnngc, nnd 
I had the plcasurc of bcing chnllcngcd by a sentry, which I ccrtnidy nercr cxpcctcd 
to  occur again in tho citadcl of Qucbcc. I cannot tliercforo orerstatc tho obligation 
which not only wo oursclrcs as representing Impcrinl intercsts in this p c a t  question, 
but tlic Dominion of Canada ones to Colonel Strnngc for hi3 efforts to kccp dire by 
what is personally a charnctcristic of thc man himself, a spirit of Eoldicrship nnd of 
zed, which would othernisc ham no rcprcscntntioii them I am ono of those who 
think tho best security wo harc for thc pcncc of Canada i3 the multiplication of 
commcrcial tics, the cxercisc of a wise diplomacy, nnd the rcmoral of eourccs of 
irritation. Ruin to Canada would bc ruin to multitudcs in all thc R’orthcrn States. 
Great and prosperous t o m s  now lire upon thc Canadian trade, thcrcforc designs 
of a liostilc naturc aminst Canada, more Ecrious than Fcnian rnids, arc as fiir rcmotc 
as anything in politi:s a n  bc said to bc. But thcrc is nnother point of ricn. No 
doubt the dcrclopcnt of tho martial instinct of nny rncc is csscntial to its ECV- 
rcspcct. If them is one obli ation more than nnothcr which wc owc to Lord pal- 
merston it is that by I& time& espendituro of eight millions of money ho increased 
thc self-respect, the freedom from pnnic fears nnd periodicallits of nlarm and uncasi- 
ness that used to seizc tho puhlic mind before rro had the pea t  defences which ha 
dcrelopcd. Lord Palmcrston’s cam did not stop with Great Britain. Although 
tho cspendituro was compamtircly restrictcd to home ports, a good deal was in fact 
cxpcndcd abroad, and what is morc, peat  designs wcrc maturcd and prepared, and 
only nccd thc pursc strings to bc opcncd to placc Canada in thc Enme position of 
eecurity. The natural fenturcs of Canada nrc, of course, of an indelible cliarnctcr. 
l h e r c  i3 thc Lowcr St. Lawrcncc, which is the key to tho whole position. Thcrc is 
tho C2ificdty of dcfcncc of Wcstern Cnnada, thc ccrtninty that wc must conccntrntc 
our troops a t  thrcc or four p a t  points, and trust to thc winter wcaring out and cx- 
hausting tho forces of nny inradcr. Them nrc martial instincts in thc mcc 
derclopcd by their pnrticular phaec of cirilisation, thc habits of daily life, which 
will make them one of tho toughest people to conquer on thc facc of tho earth, EO 
that their conquest oranncsntion without their own consent seems to mo nmornl im- 
possibility. Looking a t  it from that point of ricn I am delightcd to hcar my fricnd 
Colonel Strnngo bringing his grcnt personnl knowlcdgc to bcar upon tlic question to 
re-crcito public interest in it, but I look upon it rntlicr n3 a philosophical escrcisc 
than as a thing of grcat pncticd urgcncy. With rcgnrd to thc North Piicific thcro 
i3 onc of those questions in which a single generation of man has Eccn a most procli- 
gious change. The last speaker might ham includcd a coal-field bctwccn the YaciGc 
nnd Uppcr Canada, namely, the coal-Geld of thc Sa3lintche1ran and Pcncc Rircrs. I 
hare visited that country, and can testify to thc cxi~tcncc of coal thcrc in large 
qmntitics. Nnturc has h e r d  npparcntly’pionccred thc way for us by phcing 
exactly where wc shall somo day want it, thc storcs of coalncccssary for our purpose, 
and tho iron will not bc far off. But whether tho Canadian Gorcrnrncnt slicnld go 
into tho rast expenditurc which they nro urged to do by tho Columbhns in com- 
fleting the milway instead of letting time itself dorclop it, making it length by 
cngth, ns is tho phn of thiir nblo and sagacious engineer, is apoint wc might discuss 
for 3 pea t  Icngth of time without coming to any agrccmcnt. I hare known Canada 
for 36 ycars, and tho adrancc in that spaco of time is bcyond nnxthing to bc mily 
imagincil; not only its materhl adrancc, but also it3 adrancc torrards those fcclings 
on ~ l i i c h  national indcpcndcucc may bc foundcrl. Thcy harc no dcsirc to bc inde- 
pcndcnt of us, and I trust that this gcncrntion nil1 ncrcr scc tlicm so, but wc must, 
of coursc, hold tlicm with n silken string; and ncrcr ira3 thcrc n moment in which 
tlic loyal nncl popular fcclings of Canada ncrc stronger in farour of thc Impcrial 
conncction than thcy arc now. 
Gencnl LOWRY: As onc who linen Canada rrcll some ycar3 ngo I rrould likc to 
say how cntircly I go with Captnin Colomb iu tho remarks hc has just ma&, and 
how gratcful I think wc sliould all bc to him and to 311.. Bmsscy for prcrious ad- 
drcsscs licrc on this subjcct, and to the a51c lccturcr of to-day-Coloncl Strnugc- 
for calling public nttcntion EO forciblF to this matter. 
Attacking m p 3 f  tlic rastcst importancc to use bcing niadc of tho present time 
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to prepare, in crcry possiblc nay b s  land, eta, and lake, our Colonics for any 
cmcrgcncy, I do Iiopc that this subject i d 1  not bc alloircd to bc lost sight of. 
lhcrc can be nonc of much @cater momcnt than that of a wcll-planncd sclicmo o f  
mutual dcfcncc and protcction bctaccn Grcat Britain and her dcpendcncic~. Such 
o schcmc nould sccm to promiso to bo bcst matured by duc consultation-say by 
mcans of o Royal Commission-bctwccn tho Impcrinl and colonial nutlloritics. It 
will not do to attcmpt to  improrisc it’whcn tho cmergcncy ia on 113. Ilancrcr it 
may bc with us in “the old country,” OUP colonics arc growing apace. If  ivc look 
at tho short span of timc it took to makc thc Unitcd States tho pC3t nation i t  now 
is, it will not bc by any means impossibla to forccast vliat durtmlie, s c r  Zcnland, 
South Africa, and British dmcrica may-nay must-bccolllc crcn in tllc timc of our 
childrcn’s children! lvhy that part only of Canada knom M Rupert’s h n d  
mid to liarc incrcascd by 20.000 inhabitants in coum of tho lost  yc:lr! And now, 
irhilc thc hearts Of tho pcoplc Of that g+mt dependency of British Nortli dmcrics 
turn to us, as wc h r c  heard this nftcrnoon, and 113, I doubt not, do thosc of tho 
pcoplc of all our colonics, a i t h  such lop1  devotion, now i3 surely tlie tilnc to lay 
dccp nnd iridc our plans for standing together as onc Empire for all 
timc. 
Coloncl NOSCBIEFF, F.R.S.: Permit mc to remark upon onc point brought for- 
ward by Colonel Strango, tho construction of thc great linc connccting, what hc 
happily namcd, the t a o  nostrils of I!ritkh America, Tit., Columbb and Lower 
Cam&. I h s c  myself bccn in tha t  central region through which this linc would 
pass, and do not know any nrailablc country which, on thc whole, is better euitcd 
for scttlcmcnt by Englishrncn. Tlic rast and fertilc undulating plains of thc ~a l l cy  
of tho Sskatchcaan, so acccssiblc by o railway, nnd really 10 ncnr to England, 
arc, ns i t  acre, clcarcd by nnturc for acttlcmcnt, nnd ready for tho plough. A con- 
dition of things exists thcrc vhich homc strtcemcn do not rcalisc, or clsc ignorc, 
although thcy might harc an important bcaring on thc crowdcd population of 
thcsc islands. Certain clnsscs of politicians-I do not say statcsmcn-in this 
country sccm ncrcr tircd of dis waging such qocstions, which they stigmatiso as 
Impcrialism, and constant1 cncfcarour to conccntntc publis attention on liomc 
aEair3, or on what Colonel i t n n g c  called thc IIomc Empirc, to thc exclusion of tho 
cxtcrnal or Colonial Empirc, concealing tho fact that tlic prospcrity of thc Iromo 
Em irc depcnds, to  a grcat cxtcnt, in thcsc days u on thc Colonial Empire, and is 
lincs of communication. 
That p e a t  territory, lying bctwccn tlic Atlantic nnd Pacific, olTcrs not only a 
lino of communication, but thc wry  thing which i3 getting crcr scarcer a3 our 
population incrcascs n t  homc, vb., land for thc poor, and opportunitics for a hcaltly 
agricultural population. Such opportunitics, ncccsmy for thc moral and pliy&al 
Lcalth, if not for political stability, arc gcttinn slualIcr in proportion aa our popu- 
lation crcry Scar incrcascs, ahcrcas our arail&lc land hero rcmnins thc mmc. In 
the healtliy rcgion through which this linc runs therc is amplc. accommodation for 
tlic surplus population of tho Unitcd Kingdom for a rc r r  long tinic, wlicrc thcy 
could scttlc and prosper without chsnging.thcir flag, to thc mutual adrantagc of tho 
colony and mother-country. I bclicrc n l ~ o  that tho construction of that Pacific 
Railroad has o stmtcgical importancc cxtcnding far beyond Canada itself, and which 
cannot easily bo czagg!ratcd. It quitc startled mc to  hear tho lecturcr rcfcr to a 
possible nct of scparntion on thc part of tho Columbinns. If such a thing wcm to 
takc place, cithcr by thcir o m  action or by cztcrnal forcc, thoso coal-fields which Sir 
IEcnry Lcfroy rcfcrrcd to as being of posaiblc futurc usc to this country, would bo 
uscd apins t  this country ; certainly ap ins t  thosc interests which thc public aro 
Icd to supposo n4ll bc conserred by confining our action within onr o m  fens. I 
trust this papcr ail1 God its w 3 ; ~  to the cars of thc public, and liclp to cnlightcn 
them a3 to a110 their bcst ad~isers arc, riz., thosc r h o  conGnc their views to what 
i3  conrcnicnt and immcdiatc, or thosc who also cmbmcc thc ~ 1 1 0 1 ~  Empire, and 
proride for thc futurc. 
Captain I?. II. COLOXB :I did not intend to spwk on this ynpcr, which is rcnlly o 
military papcr, but somo rcmarks which fell from my gal ant friend, Sir H c q  
Lcfroy, in rcfcrcncc to  what my brother said, mako it necessary that somo apcslrer 
Iikcg to  depend cren morc in futurc on that, nn (f upon thc security of our great 
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782 ‘IpE MIIsThRp ASPEOT OF O-ANADirL 
ehould draw attention clearly to thc diffcrcnce that might appcm to exist between 
thcm in rcfcrcncc to the W i c  R d m  . Sir Henry Lcfroy spoke stronglr, 
I think TO all went mth him, n3 to tho Leirnbility of ineuring pcaco by the multi- 
plication of commercial ties. As I understood my brother’s remarks, hc wished to 
point out that from the tmnsfcrcncc of commcrce, first to the Meditcrrnncnn, then 
to thc Atlnntic, thcn to tho Pacific, the fact Va8 that thc commcrcc of Austr& 
ClnKing morc n d y  into nnd through tho united Stntes. of eoursc a ma- 
mopolitan would my at once that that waa of minor importonce, becausc thc great 
thing was the p e r a l  prope of the world. I myself am not quite n cosmopolitan, 
and PO if it be the cade that the commcrcc of thc Eaet nnd of Austrnlia is drawing 
morc and more to thc United Statcs, then I eay I think thceo under English domi- 
nion arc very nearly coneerncd in &wing the commerce t h o u  h their o m  tcrri- 
toq-.  Howcrcr eatisfnctorr it may be for the gcncml aelfarc ofthc world, I think 
that wc Englishmm haw a distinct intercst in drawing commmm? by m m  of tho 
Pacific Railway throngh our o m  territory to our o m  shorts, bcausc I take it that 
if tho commercial routes get entirely Grcd cid thc United Statcs, thc result will 
ultimately bc that there will bo no usc for that rnilrnr a t  all, and that any rtmtc- 
gical value it might have, would bc lost, bccausc it Todd bo impossible to make thc 
mils3 only on thnt nccount. 
Eir &ESEI. L m o s  : I ninj statc that whcn I was a t  London about R p a r  ago, 
thcrc mns a trnin for Snn Frnncieco nctuallr n t  thc stntion whcn I d ~ c d  them, so 
thnt the commcrcc of the Pacific docs floF through Canada. 
Captain J. C. R. COLOXB : I s oko of tho trndc nnd commcrco of tho PaciGc in 
q n r d  to Australia, China, and &pm, and that is bcing cvery jcnr dnrn morc and 
morc, not round tkc norn, not through tho Suez Cannl, but tom~rds the United 
Statcs, 
Admiral Sir COOPEB Kn: I should liko to ask Colonel Stnngc one or t r o  ques- 
tions. I think hc etatcd that tho Bfnrinc Militia in Canada did not exist, nlthounh 
rorision for it was includcd in the Act of Pnrlinmcnt for the formation of &c 
h i t i n  in Canada. Kill hc kindly tell us if he knows the reasons why it is not in 
cxistcncc-whether it is bccnusc of tho expense, or becnasc of tho indisposition of 
thc pcoplc to cntcr into the marine scnicc : or whcther it is because tho Cnnadinn 
Gorcrnmcnt do not consider it of any importnnco for tho dcfcnco of tho countv? 
llicn I would ask, is thcrc an1 elcmcntarj torpcdo school, or nny idea of forming 
such a school in Canada? Is thcrc any preparation for torpcdo dcfcncc of tho 
St. Lnwrcncc? And, further, what number of rifles nrc thcrc in storc in Canada, 
and of what description, Nartini-nenry or Snider? I am wry glnd to hnrc an 
opportunity of conliming whnt. I hare hard from Coloncl Fletcher and Sir I I c q  
Lcfroy ns to thc admirublo organization of tho nrtillcv in Canada under Colonel 
Strnngc. I hnd two opportunitic3 of rritncssing its prncticc and inspccting tho 
sjstcm adopted, nnd I cnn spcak most atmrigl of thc delight I fclt on ~ c c b g  thc 
pcrfcction to which it had becn brought under lis care. 
Colonel STBASOE :I e a n n o t r k  dccidedlF as to tho causes of thc non-crttcncc 
of tho Marine Militin. I sho d think it m s  ccrtninly not duc to indiEcrcnco or 
apathy on the part of tho mnrine opnlation, either of tho ~caboard or of tlic p a t  
lakes, becausc, ns probabls tho Ar!miral knows bcttcr than I do, thc Xom Scotian 
fishcrmcn hare almp had a pent  reputation for hnrdibood nnd daring, and I 
belicrc the k k c  d o r s  arc uot far behind them. The truc canso I t a b  to bo 0 
question of money. As regards tlic torpcdocs, therc is no orgmizntion whatcrcr. 
On onc occasion, ~ h m  it wns suggested to mc (not to wt  tho St. h r r c n c o  on 
fire), but to clcar it from ice, I obtaincd from the Corporation of Quebec firc 
chnrgcs of gun-cotton, rcighing 50 Ibs. cnclr. f phccd thcso chwges undcr thc 
icc and exploded them by clcctricitr, carqing it out ns n mans of instruction to 
the Artillev Officcrs and tho mcn under my command. I also npplicd to thc 
Gorcrnmcnt to dlow mo to send Officcrn to IInlifas to bc ktructcd bx tho Ro n l  
Engineer in torpcdo practice, but tlrc question of cxpcnso ngnin camc In. I d o ,  
though I nm by no mcnns as ~ c l l  ncquainted with the mast as thc Adminl hincclf, 
did suggest in conlidcntial rcports to thc Dominion Gorernmcnt thc lmlitics that I 
thought would bc ndvkblo for toTcdoes, tho means of preventing their bcing 
drcdgcd up by corering them with o ew light gum h posihon, and othcr dctnils, 
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but I harc heard nothing further on tho subject. As rcgard3 tho rifles in Canada, 
thie point will bo referred to in tlic next lccturc. "hero arc only 70,OOO rillcs in 
Canada, 4O.ooO of which arc in the hands of the Militia, and about 80,OOO nro in 
stow. They arc of tho Snide: psttcrn, and I must my, coneidoring thc cloac cliarocter 
of the count that tho Snider rifle, which is 8 rough scrviccnblo reapon, nmw-cm 
v e v  well in% hands of thc Xilitin. I should not lilio to scc tho Gorcrnmcnt of 
Camds inrcsting in IIenry-Martini'8, but I am s o r v  to say tlic hnvc already corn. 
mcnced to do ao. 'lihcy harc now obtained a fcw Martinis, and iarc in consequence 
a mixed arm and a mixcd ammunition, with all its dirPdrantoge3, but I ~ ~ 3 6  not 
consulted on that point, nor thc General comnianding, sppmntly, na hc condemns the 
purclineo in this yCar'6 report. 
Commandcr GGRDOS, R.N. : 'I should Like to ask Colonel Strango on0 qnsation. 
Arc thc guns which hc hae informed UB arc mounted at tho various batteries in the 
Dominion intended to bc tho prmnncnt establishment of p u s  for those pIacc3P 
Thc Americans nro the only serious foes x o  are likely to cncountcr in thcsc pnrts. 
zf wc wcrc to go to war with thcm wc should ham pomc very hcarilf armourcd 
monitors brought against us, and no6 one of thc yns that Colonel Stnngc hns men. 
tioncd is capblo of piercing thoee monitors. 
Colonel ST~ASGE: In answer to Commandcr Gnrdon, I must any I dorout17 
hope that the limit of the scnbonrd armament ha6 not bcm rcached. Tho gnus a t  
rcscnt in position or0 put then: on the pnnciplo that half n loaf is bcttcr than no 
tread. 
Thc CIIAIIWAX: This subject hns becn so fully brought fomzrd by Colcncl 
Strange, and EO completely discussed by tho gentlemen who haro hkcn part in tho 
argument, that I Jmw nothing to add. I a n ,  howcrer, fully corroborate all that 
Colonel Stmngc has said with regard to thc quality of thc mnterinl of thc forces 
that nw in Cnnada. I hare norer met with o tincr sct of fellows nnFhcrc than tho 
Canadians, espcciall3 tho lumberers. I hnrc met thcm in thc bush; I h o w  tkcm 
well. T h g  arc mapiliccnt men, apnblc of being brought into organization in a 
r e q  short space of timc. Tho prWt difficulty, of coW€c, in Cannda. is tho smd1 
numberof tlieso mngnificcnt men, for tho rrliolc po ulntion is now below threo 
millions, as against thc enormous population Of tho 6 k e d  states. I beg on sour 
behalf to retnrn thanks Lo Coloncl Strange for his ndmirablc lecture. 
SECOSD DAY'S DISCUSSIOY. 
Sir COOPEB KEY: I ebould likc to ask Ccloncl Strangcif ho hw heard an)- conlir- 
mation of what I aper two days ago, tbnt tho dcsim 
for accession from the Dominion on tbc part of Sritish Columbia has n o r  entirely 
cens~l, and that s promi30 has bccn mnclc by tho C a n d a n  GOTCmnICnt that tho 
construction of tho Pacific Rdrond shall be taken in hend M soon a6 tbc schcmo 
can be o rpn i td .  I am strondy impressccl with tho ncccssity for tho construction 
of this nilwar ae n mattcr of Imperial policy for thc dcfencc of our colonies in 
gencml as well ss for the commercial intereats of cur o m  country, and especially for 
thc sccuritr nnd prospcrity:cf Canada. It eeems to mc tho duty of d Englishmen to 
ad rmto  that measum aa strongly as possible. HOW it is to be ended out is bcyond 
our prodnco to indicate. The llomc Gorcrnment cnnnot interfcro mth thc internal 
administration of Cnnnda, but I belierc it h tho duty of orcry Englishman to assist 
in promoting thc construction of this line. As wna romnrkcd by Captain Cclomb 
thc other day, largc s u m  of m c n q  and many rnlunblc lives hare becn expended in 
nttompting to b r e r  n practimblc north-Test pme~IgO d thou t  success, though nat 
without rnlunblc result, while the snmc object would bc obtained far more securcl 
by tho Grent l'&o Rnilroad. I tmt thnt KO shnll soon hcar that this p a t  wort 
ha3 becn undertaken. 
Colonel Amom: Im+l duQ is thc principal point now as it xras in tho 
prcricus discussion -hen wo hunl thc question askcd : "What nrc Imperial duties 
'' towards tho Colodcs?" and no onc p r c  on answcr, and that for D rcg  sufficient 
reason, which is, that it implies R policy torards the colonies, and o pdiey 
reg- glad to read in thc 
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784 TIIE NILITARP ASPECT OL.’ CAXAD-L 
rcquircs tho support of public opinion, and public opinion in this countv is Tcry 
p d t a l l y  formed, crccpting aftcr an crcnt and undcr the infIucncc of souic great 
and scnation:d occurrcnco ; but thc object of this lccturc has bccn to anticipate 
danvcrj and clifficultics, to forccust What may bc liacly lo occur and what may 
rcq& to be done. Our prcscnt coloninl sptcm bcgan, as I belierc, in 1837, nhcn 
Lord Uuhnin \rag scnt out to Canada with very fircat poircrs to scttlc existing 
diflicultics, and to that noblcman wc arc indcbtcd for a systcm of constitutional 
colonics and their fcdcration for dcfcncc, which is tho subject of this lccturc and 
discussion. Tho next p a t  step takcn ww that in which thc public dcnounccd tho 
idea that thc colonics wcrc an incumbrancc and ought to bo t h o r n  orcr, in order 
that a gcatcr homc poacr might bc kept for tho purposc of influencing Contincntal 
affairs called foreign policy, if that did not mean international pacc. Thc idca ww 
as unsound as anything could be, and it could bc E ~ O W U  to bc EO upon a military 
principlc, bcmusc a o  act upon dcfeusirc and not upon ug,gcssirc ideas. Wcall know 
that on thc Continent tho Grcat Poaers can put TTC may say 500,000 men under 
arms, with double that numbcr of trained men as a rcscrrc, and an cqual numbcr 
again ready to bc allcd up by compulsorr E C ~ ~ ~ C C ,  and thcrc is thc root of thc whole 
qucstion; it is thc dilTcrencc bctwecn tho compulsog service and roluntary scrriec. 
Ercgthing m t h  us must bc roluntarj, c q i n g  it on to thc colonies themsclrcs, 
and what thcr do must bo roluntaq. Eoery colony, which from itsroluntary power 
prorides for its o n  defence, contributes it3 full quota towards tho gcneml Jm crial 
snfety inasmuch IU it has donc its art. With respect to all constitutional coronics 
thc first consideration is whether t!cy will fulfil their full duty of dcfcndiag them- 
G C ~ ~ C S ,  and Canada, which the gallant lecturer has brought EO forcibly bcforo u3, lias 
sct a TCV strong cramplc in that rcspeet, and 1 think wo ought rill to bc ocry mneh 
indcbtcd to him for tho ablcpanncr in which he ha3 brought before u3 thc facilities 
with which a nilmy may bc built, and tho facilities byahich n military colonization 
can bc cffccted, homuch as thc t a o  could be easily madc to work togcthcr, and thc 
systcm which men understand in a regiment should bc us& in thc construction of n 
Captain J. C. R. COLOUB, R.1I.A. : I qoitc agrco with tbc obsemation of thc last 
spcaker, that if n colony has prorided for its own dcfeneo it has done its duty, but 
tho difficulty is to determine d i n t  is its o m  defence. If you takc somc of Tour own 
colonies that arc nou cngagcd in doing that rcrg thing, and fipcnding n considernblc 
clcal of moncy in their om quarter of our globc, you would find that they arc doing 
nothing with regard to something Tifa1 to their own interest, and that is nothing 
for tho protcction of thcir cnonnous ncalth passing orcr thc ma. Thc real cliffi- 
culty in thc matter of thisTncific Railway sccms to bc om of moncy. I do not 
think it is a question of political feeling bctaccn thc mother countv and Canada a t  
all. Canada rccopiscs thc ncccssitj for thk n i l m y  us r i t d  to her future, but sho 
has not got thc moncj to makc it. On tho other hand, KC in tbk country EI it is a 
Canadian concern, when it is no S U C ~  thin ; it is a concern which is ritafto our 
wliolc Emphr, for by it Ira should obtain t f c  shortest routo for the wholo of tho 
C h c s c ,  Japancsc, and Australian tndcs. A question has becn asked nbout tho 
secession of Columbia, but behind that thcrc ia anothcr question which really affccts 
us mith rcgard to Vnncourcr’s Island, that is, thc question of an Impcrial dock. . I 
dnrc distinpishcd n a r d  Officcrs hcrc, do not know that British Columbia 11% 
nlready crpcndcd cquiralcnt to 40,OOOZ. in labour and phnt  in commcncing thc 
building of an Impcrial dock. It i3 re11 that thesc things should be known, but 
thoic rcports arc not hid bcforo Parhmcnt, and thc conscqucnco is sho h s  bccp 
placed in thc position of commencing a dock which E ~ C  cannot finish. She joined 
tlic Dominion on the condition of tho Pacific Railway bcing madc; thc nilvay has 
not bccn made, and E ~ C  has bccn left d t h  this unfinished dock, involving cipcndi- 
turc of capital, on her hands, which unfinished dock E ~ C  has offcred to tho Imperial 
Gorcmmcnt. Shc has expended thc moncy, and she sap, “for gooducss’ snhc tohe it 
‘‘ off our Bands, and complctc it as an Imperial dock,” and A d m i d  aftcr Adminl in 
thc Pacific has urgcd and presscd our Gorcrnment about thc importancc to u3 of 
that position, and thc necessity of haring, 15,0000 miles away from homc, n placo 
wherc we can dock a ship ; but peoplc in this countv do not h o w  it. Thc fact is 
wo nrc afrnid to look into the whole question, and the rcaEon why we mzy losc this 
nilway. 
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TIIE MILITARY ASPECT OF C.LYAD.1. ‘is5 
wholc prorincc, tho rcason KC arc afraid to makc E U C ~  preparation to maintain our 
command of tho sea in tlic Xorth Pacific, is bcawo wc b r c  not dircct communication 
with it. Thercforc tlic Pacific Railway bccomcs conncctcd with the dock-, thc Van- 
coiircr Dock i3, like tho Tancourcr coal, conncctcd nith our commnd of the ~ C I  in 
thc Xorth Paciffo ; thc command of thc South Pacilic gocs with it, and our Empirc 
of half tho world is a t  stake. KO- x o  nt homc nro much morc intcrcstcd in our 
o m  &airs than in tho affairs of thosc who eomo after us, and thcrcforc thcrc is a 
rica of thi3 Pacific Bailrny I should likc to bring fomard. Colonel Strnngc has 
alrcady dwelt upon it, but it i3 important in eonncction with thc I’aeilic Railway 
nnd with colonization. What thc colonicsnantis population, and rhat wo harc too 
much of in England is populntion. At thc present timc  our food supply t in tho 
lands of forcign Powers ; but supposing thls milway to be made, you would then 
hare vithin 14 or 15 days of England this enormous British tnct  of tho bcst food- 
producing hndin tho world, and which when got at, would I belicremaintainits fod-  
producing powcr against thc wholo world. Thcrc is plenty of cridcncc to that 
effect. You haw got that British wasto land closc to TOU. You do h o t  choorc to 
makc that rdwny to dcrclop it, and to enable home population to 6Ct a t  it, you 
chooao rnther to say it is a Canadian concern. What is tho conscgucncc? As I 
said tho othcr b y ,  out of somo 54,000,000 quartera of wheat imported into tho 
Unitd Kingdom in 1877 wc got about 22,000,000 from Amcricn. 4 month y o  
sou may haw noticed in thc papers it was cliscorercd that a ring cristcd in dmencs 
for b u p g  up nnd controlling tho cxport of tho corn crop of the jar ,  and if it had 
not bcen accidentdly found out ~ o u  would in this country ham s d c r d  from that 
by arbitmryrisc in thc prim of Tour food A8 long ns English pcoplc nrc content to 
let their food comc from n foreign country whcn the hare got food-producing 
wealth of their o m  throm before thcm by Nature, w h d  they hare only to pick up 
and mako usc of, thcy must remember thiq that tho control of their food will haw 
passed out of their bands through their o m  blindness nnd ncglect. Such a “ring” 
would bc impotsiblc in Cnnnda if our food wns produccd therc, bccnusc commcrcinl 
transactions nre yarded and protected by Brit& LIT. It nas stated in tho dis- 
cussion here the othcr day that TO m r c  to hold Canads and our colonies with o 
“siken string?’ I know it is P wry popubr phrnsc, but in wing it  wc must 
rcmembcr that thcrc arc two cnds to the string. It is not nltogcthcr a question for 
rou, it is a qucstion for tho colonics at thc othcr end ns Tell ; and whcn peoplc talk 
‘;f cutting colonies ddrift they must rcmcmber also that if thc rcscnt nction of tho 
United Lingdoru bc not worthy of its position ns thc hnd 04 the Empirc, beforo 
much timo passed, tho colonies might in disgust talk of cuttin- it adrift. Thcrcforc 
in talking about consolidation wc must also tnlk about rec?procity of duties and 
obligntions. If v c  rlcsirc to keep thc colodcs it must not bc by a loose string, but 
by a G r m  hold at  both end& and by a mutun1 systcm of $TO and take. With r c p d  
to thc “smcn string” 1 think oficcr3 of the &-my nnd h’ary should closdy 
examine ns to nhethcr wo arc not ctting a good deal of shoddy into that string ; in 
fact it may not bo silk at all. ‘Tc%arc heard of thcsc Canadian Schools of Gunnery, 
bc., those admirnble institutions for \rJ&li Cnnada and the Empiro has h e n  in- 
debtcd to tlic encra of our lccturcr a d  his collmgucs. Many of you haw rcad 
tlic admirable Prizo Essays by Officcre reard in those Dominion 8cbools, and you 
must scc thcrc is coming on in Canada a Echo01 of highlptraincd scicntitic 05iccrsJ 
and TOU say, “ “hnt b a very thing ; let them go on:’ I ho e t h y  will go on, 
and ‘I am surc thcy will as long as they hmc Officers l i b  our & a n t  fricnd. But 
JOU must rcmcmbcr nt prcscnt your superior appointments in Canada arc held by 
Iinpcrial Oficcrs sent from Enghnd. Wicn you get a number of crccllcntly-cdu- 
crtcd, n ( l m i r a b I ~ t ~ i n c c 1 m ~ t a ~  Omccrs of Canadinn JIilith ns you harc noa grow- 
ing up in Dominion schools at th& moment, do you think that t h q  d bc content 
n l m p  to occu subordinntc positions in Canada? Thcy will not ; it is unnatural 
that they shoug Thercforc I say yon haw to look to that fact, and to trmt thcm 
as Englishmcn, and as much a part of England’s military strength as if tbcy wcro 
born in Xddlcscs. l’vo know it is thc nmbition of Engliihmcn t o  rise to tllc 
highat rnnks of their profession, but at prcaent thc highest militan positions cren 
in  their o m  localitic3 sccm to bc out of rcach of thc colonists. Th> IIono JIilitia 
oIFcrs a road into thc Army; but IOU shut thc p t c  on Canadinns b j  caring tlic 
TOOL. LXIII. 3a  
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7% TIE NILITARY ASPECT OF CASADA 
Cznn(1ian Ifilitia din11 not bc R step ing Etonc for tlicm’into thc A m y  of thc 
Queen, and tllus ~ o u  bar thcm oot. f f  thc qiicstion of In~pci<al dcfcncc is crcr to 
bc scttlcd on n cl&hlc bnais i t  must be on hroadcr principlcs than ‘‘silkcn string 
‘‘ tlicorics,” and thc qucstiou must bc dmlt with Iioncstl3; thoroughly, and 
trulr. 
Colnmandcr G ~ D O S ,  R.X. : I shonlrl likc to ask Colonel Strnnec nhctlicr any 
p q ) o ~ a 1  has bccn brought forward in tho Domiuion IIousc of J? n r  1’ inmcnt for tho 
6~pp ly  of mone~- to crcct n small arm factor)- in Canada--n.helllcr if i t  ha3 bccn 
proposcc‘l, it ~ras rcjcctcd or not, and if rcjcctcd, by how largo R majoritj ? I had 
the plcesurc of bcing hcrc two jcars ago, wlicn Captain Colonib rcad a wry ablo 
p q c r  alluding to Tancourcr’s Island and tho Dominion. I thcn suggcstcd that 
a prrison should bc sent out from England, and I hopcd that it might liarc 
bee? donc. ‘This gni~kon, for mom reasons than onc, should bc compscd of 
innriccs antl marinc artillcq-, EO that thcr inar bc at thc disposal of thc Admiral 
in command of tlic station. I think Taincourer’s Island, in tlic opinion of most 
pcoplc wlio knov that part of tlic ~rorld, E h O d d  bc nn Impcrial COIOIIT, or at all 
cvcnts an h ipcr id  garrison, Ihc snmc as FC Jiarc a t  Ihlifas on thc*othcr sidc. 
l l icrc arc no docks of any dcscription that xrc can go to, unlcss nc go to thc 
Amcricnns n t  San Francisco. IVc hnrc an cnomous trnclc with tho Pacific coast. 
I lrarc Eccn 70,000 tons of British rhipping Ijing in S:in Francisco a t  oiic time, 
rraiting for nhcnt. Of coum if m r  breaks out with Anicricn-tco inust alludc to  
tlicsc qucstiocs in connection with that pnrt of thc norld-tlint trado of coursc 
would go, but wc should linrc to protect tlic ~ d ~ o l c  of our shipping in the Pacific, 
and a grrat portion of our China tradc on that sidc, and m harc not a singlo 
dock that irc could put our mcn-of-nar into a t  all. It is abrolutclc ncccssary tl:at 
wc should gct a suupply of coal on tho a p t  ; that s i ipp l~  of coal can on1.r bc got n t  
onc pI:icc, Vancourcr’s Is!nnir. Tlicrcforc it is nb:olutcly ncccssan that for military 
pnrposcs tliosc coal supplics slioitld bo propcrlr dcfcndcd. T h y  c k o t  bc dcfcndcd 
vitlioiit a garrison. S h i p  cm do a p a t  dcnl, but joii must liarc a prrison to  
protect Four batteries, nnd thoss battcrics must bc placed to protect jonr nrscnnls 
aud coal supplics in timc of Tar. Tlicrc is no doubt that thc construction of thc 
C a d i a n  Pacific Rniltvay n t  any cost isan RLsoltde aecessity if ivcore going to  main- 
tain thc Dominion of Canada. Tlint r ica  has bccn prcsscd on tho Gorcrnmcnt 
again and ngain. Tlicrc is no doubt that tlic Anicricnns placc crcrr poasib!c obstaclc 
in our war  to prcrcnt tlic coinplction of tlic Canadian I’acific Rniln-ar, for tlri3 r c ~  
good reason, tlint tlicr knun-if it is not carricd out soon, British Colurubis must fnU 
.into thcir mouth likc a r i p  chcrry. 
I t  is no good EhtlttiIlg our q c s  to n stern fact that thc mnnnbctiirc of cotton 
g00d3 has ccnscd to be R protitablc cmp1o;rmcnt in this rountq. That mcni:s that 
an adult population of four millions in Lancnshirc and clscnhcrc nil1 sliortlj lose 
tlicir mcnns of lircliliood and liarc to bc pro&d for otbcririsc; and all tliis timc 
wc lmrc imincnso tracts of lnnd in thc Dominion antl other colonics to nliieli thcy 
might bc d ram,  ihc connection bctwccn thc colonics and thc mothcr countrr 
atrcnctlicncd, nnd riots and pcrlraps fxr rorsc conseqncnccs aroidcd. This scllcnw 
codrl bc cnsily carricd out if thc Gorcrnmcnt chosc to malic cmigration 3 national 
nicasurc, dirccted by thcmsclrcs. They could raisc B lnrgc loan a t  3f per ccnt., 
paFiug thc pmagc3 out of Inarricd couples, thcir mnintciianco’ for tlic f i r s t  jcar, 
:ind tlic crcction of thc ncccsrary bnildings, the Cdonid Gorcrnmcnts on ilicir sidc 
granting farms of sax 200 acrcs to cadi mnrricd couplc, thc moncy crpcn~lcd by tho 
lIoinc Gorcrnmcnt being cliargcd as s mortgage of 5 pcr ccnt. on tho title dceds 
cf them farms, rcpapblc to tho Home Gorcrnmcnt in tcrms of tlircc, Grc, and 
s e ~ c n  jcars, thc Colonial Gorcrnmcnts bcing rcsponsiblc for thc collcction and trans- 
nission homo of thc moncy. 
UnlrS3 somc mcasurc of thi,s sort is adoptcd rerr soon, with failing mnnuhcturcs, 
R populntion thron-n more crcrr day oaf of cmplojment, with n capital of ney l r  
500 millions lockcd up in niachincry and buildings, Sre., wc elinll haw a wry  scrims 
crisis in this countv, and I scc no statcsmau on tlic scenc who is preparing for this 
dinicult;r, and 1133 the pluck to proposc a mcasurc of this dcscription to thc country. 
Coloncl JIOSCRrEFF, F.R.S.: A s  so fcm pcoplc harc rioitcd that m a p i -  
ficcnt tcrritov through ~ L c h  this miltray is proposcd to pass, I think it a 
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TIIE JIILITARS ASPECT 01’ CAXADL 
good opportunit.7 to say n r c l ~  fcu nor& about its cl~anctcr, having bccn tlicro 
myself. ‘Alien tho linc mas (L3.sa bctwcln tho Canaaian nnd Smcrican pos3cs- 
EiOWS, nltliough thc Aincricans a3 usual stole n maw11 upon us and put it further 
north than was origindlj intcndccl, i t  ia n rcmarhblc fact that tho linc in 
this longituao cuts off a rcry poor district lying bctwccn tho Xissouri and 
British tcnitorr, and which from tlic porcrty of tho soil cannot support moro 
than a   par so ppulntion, rrlicrms on tho othcr or north aidc of tho line you 
gct into n bctter awl richcr coiintv, cmbracino tho Assiniboin and tlio two 
mnllcys of tho Sash-atchcwnn. l l i a t  rircr i3 ima&blo for Iiunclrcdj of n i h ,  
and nil1 be a uschl nrtcry for ccmmcrcc, it3 two forks running towards m u .  
nipcg, and crtcnding back wcjt tomnls tho XocJiy Xountains, dn ia  an cnor- 
u o u s  arca. A Brent part of this arc3 is capnblc of culfiratiou, and l ~ a s  many 
mourccs, among otlicrs c o d  It ecrtainly enjoys a hcdthy climatc for our mcc. 
Tho climatc in tlic rallcj of tho S~nlratclicrran is bcttcr than that of Canada in tho 
corrcspnding latitude, as the isothermal lincs rise t o d s  tho ncst. I hare knorm 
troop3 of Iiorscs in winter aandcring thcra without anj attention nhatcrcr in thc 
bush ; in fact twcnty 3can ago, and it may bc now for =bat I know, it was t11c 
cutom of scftlcrs in SclLirk sctt!cmcnt to scnd out large troops of Iiorscs to tho 
bush, irhcre thcy l i d  vithoiit any attention all tho winter, and they wcro herded 
back when rcquircd for summcr USC. This splcndid rcgion i3 FO littlo known and 
nppmecintcd that.tBc charge of making a nilway through it, which \roull opcn it up  
and cnormoudy incrcw its valuc, is thrown first br Canada on England for wnnt of 
incans, and thcn back by England on Canado for rant of howlcdgc. 3Iy own 
opinion is th t  if thc rcal facts of tho caac wcre bnon-n on thc Stock Excliangc and 
by our rich people, and if t h y  linca tho concessions of land r k i c l ~  could Iicrc at 
OIICC bc madc to tlic milmr, instcad of tbU5 holdi~g back, tlicro n-ould bc n rush 
to sccurc shares in such 311 cntcrprisc. So much for tho schcluc as a lcgitirtiatc and 
uiltimatclj profitable spccuktion. It i3, hoacrcr, on tlio ground of it3 Impcrial and 
stmtegiml impcrtancc that. tlic strongcst reasons for its constructicu arc to be fouud. 
lIerc is n p x t  field for our surplus population; and if England 11% not lost tho 
Ilnpcrial facultr of organizing armnncmcnts for hcr pcopIc, why should not somo 
such sclicmc ns\hat prop03ca by CoToncl Stmngo for making tlic colonization, tlio 
military dcfcncc, tho constructiou of tho r d w t y ,  and the propcr a d  orderly 
pxcmmcnt of t h t  country go hand in liand be thus carried ou t?  TF7irt 
lins bccn mid b othcr speakers and in tho pnpcr on tbc stratcdc iinportaucc 
of conncziing * c t L  t vo  nostrils” of Britijh xorth ilrccriclr I liopo m i l l  mwo atten- 
tion to this matter in tlic propcr q~artcrs. 
Coloncl Ar.coc~ : Colonel 3foncric5 tius touchcd upon o w r y  important subjcct 
in mcntioning tlic Stock Eschangc, because tho mhtako that this country has  mndc 
bas bccn in iurcsting moncy in foreign sccuritics instad of inresting it in Impcrial, 
that is, in colonial tccurities; and to @TC tlic slrongcst yssibl: instancc nitli 
rcqJcct to a railwar, tho Russian milways haro becn built wit I En&h money, and 
but for that wc should not haV0 liad tho rcccnt rnr. Russia would not liarc bccn 
preprod for it 39 soon or ns \re11 as she ms, to m y  nothing of Central Asia 
and Iicr p r o p s  tormds tho East.] 
Mr. Tocsa: I should likc to cxprcss my o m  inclkiclinl gntitudc to Colonel 
Stnngc for tkc rcry clear and ablc m y  in nllich IIC has placcd bcforc us thc profcs- 
siond aspcets of this iniportnnt ucstion. 1r0 hn3 shown us thc p a t  shortcomings 
n ~ l i c ~ i  cx st in carrTing out tllc L a i l s  of tl:c3c military matters wliic~l are of snc~k 
vitd interest to  Can&. Tlic wholo qucztion seems to rcsolrc itself into one of 
cost. IIow then is thc money to 60 obtained for cnrrying out this most ncccrsar;~ 
787 
Wbctbcr I am strictly corrcct or not in what I mid about Reta in  nilvnIs, 
it mll bc admitted that they aro strategic& and mcrc for tltc aoremcnt. of troops 
and artillcq than for any rcmnncntiro pnrpc,  whilo those in Australia, for 
instancc, arc for thc dercloplncnt of thc rcsourccs of tlic country, and thc moncy 
czpcndcd on them by their Uowrnmcnt is rcprodnctircly employed, and thcrcforc 
to bo prefcrrcd a3 an inrcjtrncnt from a financml and pldanthropic, ns wcll ns from 
a patriotic point of rim. T. St. L. A. 
3 0 2  
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788 T € E  JIZITARY ASPECT OF C.LYAl)A. 
work for tllc proper dcfcnco of Canndn? Is it  to bo thrown on tho rcsourccs of tlic 
Dominion alouc, or arc wc not rnthcr ns a peoplc living undcr ono Yorcrcign to recog- 
nisc it as 3 question of Impcrial, or I would rnthcr speak of it as of nation:], im- 
portance. If that bo EO, I do not know how wo can rcfuso to rccognw our 
responsibilitic3 with re ard to it, nnd tho importancc of our doing what is required 
of us as 3 nation, in or8cr to carry it into cffcct. Thc principal point dnclt upon in 
tho discussion this aftcrnoon has been lhc  ncccssity of completing tho PnciOc Rail- 
nay; and tlicrc is no doubt tho Cnnadians nrc pcrbctly desirous of sccing it donc ; 
but they consider i t  impossible for them to do morc than they arc doing a t  prescnt. 
Unless they can hare tho Imperial nid which I think they h3rc a right to clnim, it 
will bc many a long gear bcforc that great and csscntial nork is likcly to bc com- 
plctcd. In the meantime it is 3 most serious question to  recollect that British 
Colunibin, which is thc terminus at thc other end, is in  g c a t  danger of taking somo 
stcps tonards Ecparation from tho Dominion, nnd of Calling into tho hands of another 
nation. This is 3 rery serious considerntion for us to eontcmplatc, a d  thcrc can bo 
no doubt that it is much more immincut than many peoplc in England haw nny 
idcn of. What is nanted, aftcr nll, is for somc onc on tho part of thoso who profcss 
to bo etatesmcn to tako 3 statcsmnnlike nnd comprchensire ricw of thcsc matters. 
W e  src too apt in this country to look far too much merely to our lorn1 interests, 
and do not extend our vision to  thc morc rcmotc corner3 of our enormous Empire. 
But it will not do for us to  continuc to dwell in such 3 “ fool’s pnndiac” r e 7  much 
longer, or we ehnll bo somo day auddenly awakcncd to a rery serious condition of 
things. The question of cmigmtion Lss been touched upon. It i3 a nntional one. 
It docs sccm to me most crtnordinary thatwc inEngland, who arc continridly com- 
plaining of our being orerpopulated, nnd nrc constantly sccing thc tcrriblo distrcss 
that occurs in many of our p e n t  centres of population from nn undoubted eupcr- 
abundancc of coplc, cannot cvolrc somc national schcme for taking that surplus 
3way to  tho otgcr parts of our Pmpiro nliich are urgently Tnnting them, and on1 
rcquim them to bo propcrly transported to their shorcs. Tliesc arc questions n h i d  
wc must frankly face beforc lon and it is rery desirablo that so influential 3 class 
a~ military and nard men shoulfturn their attention to them, in order to forco tho 
Gorcrnmcnt to tako them up, in defercncc to cnlightcned public opinion, in 3 w3y 
which their pnnmount national importancc demands. 
The CIIAIWAS : I am not ono of thosc nho bclicrc in tho dccndcncc of England, 
or in thc incnpability of our statcsmcn, our (merchants, and our financier3 to gm3p 
n grcat idea nnd carry i t  out. Vuch that has bccn said of thcir folly and infatuation 
in not completing this Pacific Railmy appcars t o  mc p t u i t o u s  and unfoundcd. 
Thcrc nrc enormous difficulties in tho achicrcmcnt of such a project ; thc idcn of 
thc Canadian Gorcrnmcnt is to csecutc tho railwq step by step, as thcrc shall bo n 
population to benefit by it, or as sections of 100 or 200 miles can bc shorn to bc 
profitable; and if wc only nllov timc, it <rill Gnd its Kay by that roccss to thc 
PneiGc. But I must say, I for one should think it tho height of fofy on tho part 
of thc Canadian Gorcrnmcnt to rush into this p e a t  nork in its entirety at  tho 
r s c n t  timc, or for any party of En, dish statesmen, mspnsiblc to tho pcoplc of 
ngland for thcir tntation, to roluntccr to  lcnd them 20,000,0002. or nny similar 
sum that thcy might rcquirc. Gentlemen of thc Stock Exchnnw can tcll you some- 
thing of tlic capital that hs nlrcady gonc to Cnwdn for maliiig railwajr, scnrccl~ 
onc of which at present pap. I t lhk ,  thercforc, wc must bc n littlc paticnt ; TTC 
cannot anticipatc what is rcally tho nork of tho slorr dcrclopmcnt of history. Wo 
linro no moro marrellous proof of thc rapidity of that dcrclopmcnt than in tho 
subject nliicli has been brought bcforo us by Coloncl Strnngo today. It b but 
40 years sincc a handful of French Canadians, on grounds so obscuro that they an? 
nlmost forgottcn, hnlf frightcncd us out of our senses lest n c  should loec Lower 
Cnnnda, led to enormous and costly cfforts to siipprcs3 them, nnd to tho occupation 
of tlic country for thc ncxt 30 year3 by 3 strong Impcrial garrison. Xon- tho 
calmtry is in 3 far moro logd position and temper towards tlic British Enipirc than 
it crcr was bcforc. It has dcrelopcd what is n perfectly new thing in Colonial 
history, 3 regularly organizd, ncll-conccircd militia sgstcm, cmbrncing crcry branch 
of instruction from tho hinhcst to  thc loncst, not rcaliscd perhaps as fully 0.3 i t  
exists on paper; but thcro 7s tho seed, out of nhich tho matured plant m y  herc- 
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aftcr grow. Can rro not bc contcntcd nith that for onc gcncration? Can n c  not 
1ct thcsc magnificent drcnms of cmpirc xrork thcmsclrcs out according to thc destiny 
of nations? Wlicrc is tho prcscnt dangcr? What was tho condition of thc IJnitcd 
Statcs itself in rcgard to its militav armaments prior to thc great contcst of North 
and South? Why, they xvcrc n3 thoroughly ncglcctcd as they werc in Canada j 
thcy thought thcmeclrcs frcc from cxtcrnal foc3, and thcrcforc could nffod to dis- 
pcnsc vith them. T h y  hnrc sincc dcrclopcd them to Eomc cxtcnt, but they arc 
etill, 3 s  mcsurcd b j  thc E C ~ C  of Buropcnn prcpamtion, in a T C ~  dcfectiro stato. 
Canada can also afford to lcmc much that is in an abstract scmc im rtant, to bc 
met nhcn thc ncccssity ariscs. Of course n o  admit thc ncccssity of E & g  o. fcnn- 
dation laid to carry any futurc supcrstructurc ; but to 6 3 ~  that crerything that m y  
liarc to bc donc in nap is to bc donc in anticipation in timc of pcncc, is to ask what 
no responsible statesman can agcc to ; and I do not think that any onc of us, if wc 
wcrc addressing a constitucncy with n riclr to clcction to Parlinmcnt, would rcnturc 
to ndopt such a linc of argument. 
Colonel STEASGE : I thank you rcq- much for thc rcmarks thnt haw bccn made, 
which I think nro crcn more raluablc than the pnpcr itself. I harc not hcnrd that 
thc seccssion question of British Columbia has bccn settled in Canada. Sir Coopcr 
Kcy remarked that thc English Gorcrnmcnt wcrc not in a position to intcrfcrc in 
this mattcr. To a ccrtain extcnt of coursc n e  all know that is quitc true, but 
surcl to purchasc shnrcs in a Canadian PnciEc railway would bc ns lcgitimntc n3 to 
purcinsc rharcs in thc Sucz Canal. Surely wo arc as closely conncctcd with Canads 
as nc arc or might bc with Egypt. I harc nlso bccn asked whether thcrc ha3 been 
8 rotc beforc l’arlinment for a small-nrms factory in Cannda. Tho mattcr has nercr 
been brought beforc Parliament. I hare urged it in Official Reports, in Bluu 
Boo& which arc laid beforc Parliament, but npparcntly ncrcr mad. 
With regard to Sir Henry Lefroy’s rcmarks, I am not in a position cxactly to  
nnsncr them. I know his long familiarity nith thc country and his great rrisdoni, 
andi t  would sccm presumption for mc to eny anything on thc subject in the vay of 
reply. 1Ic alludcd to tho Rebellion of 1837,as giving us 30 ycnrs’ militnq- occupa- 
tion and trouble, but another spcnkcr pointed out it the want of considering what 
tho Frcnch Canadians nantcd in timc that nns thc cnusc of all this, and Sir Henry 
kimsclf has alluded to the mamcllous dcrelopment of things now-a-dnys that rcquircs 
LW to bc up and doing, and Kill not allow us to drift as wc used to drift in tho old 
timcs. IIc spokc about dmcrican pcoplc not haFing military institutions and orga- 
nization until tho Civil War obligcd them to ; but would thcy ha70 had any ciril 
Tar a t  all if thcy had thought about it 3 little beforehand? Then a3 to the security 
of money lent to Camds, I have alrcndy referred to the differcncc between tho 
Pacific and tho G n n d  Trunk, in which tho English pcoplc took shares, and in 
which Canadian people had scarcely any shares a t  all, and in which therc nerc not 
Tnst tracts of rich amblc alluvial land to girc away. If the Sasliatchcwan Vallcy is 
as creybodr says it is who hay seen it, a rich fcrtilc alluvial soil, whcrc therc is cod 
cropping out from tho banks of thc rircr rendy to bc used, I must submit, with dl 
tho mshncss of youth, I cannot scc nny rewon why thia railmy should not bo 
K d C .  
Thc CIIAIEXAX: I think I may rcnturc in your mmc to return to Colonel 
Stnngc our hcarty thanks for a most interesting, original, and thoi~ghtful papcr. I 
should anmer Coloncl Stnngc’s last rcmarks about thc Snskntchcmn, by sn+g I 
h r c  hid no other feeling than a Fish to dispel illusions. When you talk of thc 
Saskntchewan and talk of many thousands of squrc miles of tcrritorj, no doubt in 
thosc thousands of squam miles thcrc arc fertile tracts whcrc p a i n  can bc rniscd, 
and thcrc is some inmcrcnt  cod. But it is a p a t  mistakc to supposc that tho 
aholc rcgion b so fertile, or that the climatc u altogether such aa Englishmen 
would dclight in. I think I may cxpres3 our united hopc that Colonel Strangc, 111 
rcturning to Canada and to his w r y  important duty thcrc, mll return haring his 
hanh strengthened by nhatcrcr moi*al inllucncc our npproral and respect for hk 
c n c r a  and zeal can afford him, and that he will bc enablcd in his futurc ncgotia- 
tions vith tho Canadian Gorernmcnt to carry, as ncll ns hc descrrej, a greater 
dcgrcc of ncight than appears to hare bccn hitherto &en to him. 
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